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ABSTRACT
EXTENDING DIFFERENCE OF VOTES RULES ON THREE VOTING MODELS
Sarah Schulz King
June 16, 2017
In a voting situation where there are only two competing alternatives, simple
majority rule outputs the alternatives with the most votes or declares a tie if both
alternatives receive the same number of votes. For any nonnegative integer k,
the difference of votes rule Mk outputs the alternative that beats the competing
alternative by more than k votes. Llamazares (2006) gives a characterization of the
difference of votes rules in terms of five axioms. In this thesis, we extend Llamazares’
result by completely describing the class of voting rules that satisfy only two out
of his five axioms. In addition, we state and prove Llamazares’ theorem in voting
models where either there is an infinite number of votes or each voter is allowed
to express an intensity level for one alternative over the other. Finally, we will
use a computer simulation to compare different voting methods to simple majority
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In 1952 Kenneth May characterized simple majority rule (SMR) in terms of
three axioms [12]. This characterization of (SMR) is known as May’s Theorem and
it is considered a fundamental result in the area of social choice theory. In fact, one
goal of social choice theory is to help provide an in-depth understanding of how var-
ious voting functions work. While (SMR) is a popular voting method, often times,
(SMR) does not allow for the proper threshold of support before winning, since an
alternative only has to win by one vote. More classes of majority rule functions have
been introduced in the literature by Fishburn [6], Asan and Sanver [2], Llamazares
[7] and Houy [10], and most have been characterized axiomatically. One class of
majority rules introduced by Bonifacio Llamazares was coined the “difference of
votes” rules [11]. These rules require the difference between the number of votes in
favor of any alternative and the number of votes in favor of the other alternative
to be greater than some fixed integer k in order to choose that alternative. The
axiomatic characterization provided by Llamazares included five axioms. The first
goal of this dissertation is to extend the difference of votes rules, by reducing the
number of axioms in Llamazares’ characterization. After that, we will further ex-
tend the difference of votes rules, by characterizing the same rules as Llamazares
in an infinite model based on a countably infinite set of voters. Moreover, we will
extend some of our results from the finite model to the infinite model. We will
then examine a third model, known as the fuzzy voting model, or fuzzy aggrega-
tion model. Llamazares and Garcia-Lapresta extended Llamazares’ results to this
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model [8] in 2010. Our goal will be to redefine these rules more intuitively and to
characterize these rules through the use of two new lemmas. Lastly, we will analyze
a computer simulation of voting rules that was developed to compare various voting
rules on different population sizes. This simulation will compare some of the voting
methods discussed in this paper, as well as popular voting methods in the political
world.
When extending Llamazares’ difference of votes rules in the finite domain, the
first idea was to remove neutrality. The axiom of neutrality captures the idea that
a voting rule should not depend on the labeling of the two alternatives. While it is
commonly understood that the function that always outputs the same alternative is
a notable example of a non-neutral rule that satisfied many of Llamazares’ axioms,
but not neutrality, we find that the constant rule is actually part of a whole class of
functions. This class of functions will be what we refer to as the difference of votes
rules. So our version of difference of votes rules is more general than Llamazares’
version. The general version of the difference of votes rules will require the number
of votes in favor of one alternative and the number of votes in favor of the other
alternative to be greater than some fixed integer k in order to be chosen, and require
the number of votes in favor of the other alternative and the number in favor of
the first alternative to be greater than some fixed integer l in order to be chosen.
We will explore the unique relationship between the integers k and l, as well as
completely characterize these rules in this model. The next step in this model is to
remove the axiom of anonymity. The axiom of anonymity captures the idea that a
voting rule should not depend on the labeling of the voters. Since we do still require
the function to be canceallive, we will show that anonymity is implied on a large
subset of the domain. One of the main results is a complete characterization of the
class of aggregation functions with only two axioms: cancellation and monotonicity.
The infinite model has been less explored than the finite model and brings
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with it new challenges. In 2006, Mark Fey [5] extended May’s Theorem to an infinite
model where he labeled the alternatives differently from May. In this thesis, we shift
the labeling of the alternatives to match May’s labeling, and we then extend many
of the results of Llamazares as well as our own results given in the finite model. We
are able to define both types of difference of votes rules in the infinite model, and
extend Llamazares’ result, as well as part of our finite model result in the infinite
model.
The third voting model is the fuzzy aggregation model and it is based on
fuzzy set theory [13]. This domain has been defined and studied by researchers
in the area of fuzzy set theory [14], as well as those in the area of social choice
theory [7]. The model was first introduced by H. Nurmi in 1981, when examining
the idea of preference intensities [13], where the votes can give a partial favor of
one alternative over the other without expressing full favor. The most notable
results, for our purposes, in the fuzzy model have been done by Garcia-Lapresta
and Llamazares [7], [8]. They characterized a class of majority type rules in the
fuzzy model as well as a fuzzy version of the difference of votes rules. We introduce
and prove two lemmas that help in the characterization of the fuzzy difference of
votes rules given by Garcia-Lapresta and Llamazares [8]. Our new proof of the
Garcia-Lapresta and Llamazares result will hopefully lead to other results in the
fuzzy model.
The final goal of this dissertation is to analyze the outputs of a computer
program that was written to help compare and contrast different voting rules. This
program generates random votes for N voters and runs the same set of votes through
two different voting methods and then gives a comparison of the outputs. Each run
of the program generates 100 comparisons and then analyzes the actual probability
of agreement of the two voting methods. We first compare simple majority rule to
a difference of votes rule and find that the probability of agreement is much less
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than expected. Next, we use the program to compare simple majority rule to that
of the Electoral College, a voting method used in the United States to elect the
President. These results were surprising, as well, in that we had three hypotheses
and two of them seemed to be very much not the case. The third hypothesis is that
as N grew, the disagreement between (SMR) and the Electoral College would grow
as well. This hypothesis was not thrown out by our data, but was only confirmed
by a small margin. More tests will need to be run to solidify this result.
A precise description of the finite, infinite, and fuzzy voting models is given
in the next chapter. Since each model has a different domain, the sets of voters,
and could have different possible outputs, making comparisons among these three




A FINITE VOTING MODEL
The focus of this chapter is to introduce three voting models based on a
slate of two candidates or alternatives. For example, a group of graduate students
want to have a party where they will serve either wine or coke, but not both. Each
graduate student votes for either wine, coke, or neither. By voting neither, the
student abstains, maybe because they wanted to serve beer, but it was not put as
an option, or they simply do not care what is served. The collection of votes is
aggregated in some way and a winner is determined. This type of voting situation
has been studied extensively in the social choice literature, for example Part I of
Fishburn’s book [6]. In our first two models, the alternatives are denoted by the
integers 1 and −1. In the example above, we could denote a vote for coke with a 1
and a vote for wine with a −1. The integer 0 will be used to represent an abstention
vote.
DEFINITION 2.1. Any function of the form
f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1}
where n ≥ 2 is an integer is called a finite aggregation function, or finite aggregation
rule. An element in the domain, denoted by
pi = (x1, x2, ..., xn),
is called a profile.
5
A finite aggregation function has three possible outputs, alternative 1, alter-
native −1 or a tie, denoted by 0. In our example, an output of 1 means that coke
is chosen, an output of −1 means that wine is chosen and an output of 0 means we
choose neither. What happens in the event of a tie can vary. Often a vote is recast
or a person in leadership makes the final decision. From this point forward, we
will refer to functions in this model as aggregation functions, dropping the “finite”
adjective.
Here is a simple example of an aggregation function to help the reader un-
derstand Definition 2.1 more clearly.
EXAMPLE 2.1. Define f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} as follows. For any profile
pi = (x1, x2, ..., xn),
f(pi) = x1 ⋅ x2 ⋅ ... ⋅ xn
where the output of f is determined by the multiplication of each entry of pi, or each
voter’s choice.
We will define various sets of the voting profile in order to help with analysis
of the finite aggregation functions we will study.
DEFINITION 2.2. The set of voters in a profile pi = (x1, x2, ..., xn), n ≥ 2, will be
denoted by N . So N is the integers in the interval [1, n]. The set of voters who
voted for each alternative will be denoted as follows:
N+(pi) = {i ∈ N ∶ xi = 1}, N−(pi) = {i ∈ N ∶ xi = −1}, and N0(pi) = {i ∈ N ∶ xi = 0}.
Finally, n+(pi) = ∣N+(pi)∣, n−(pi) = ∣N−(pi)∣, and n0(pi) = ∣N0(pi)∣.
Notice that the aggregation function f given in Example 2.1, can be defined
by f(pi) = 0 if n0(pi) > 0 and f(pi) = −1n−(pi), if n0(pi) = 0.
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DEFINITION 2.3. The notation E− represents the profile where all voters choose−1, E+ represents the profile where all voters choose 1, and 0⃗ represents the profile
where all voters abstain.
The next step is to introduce some properties that a given aggregation func-
tion may or may not satisfy.
DEFINITION 2.4. An aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} satisfies
Anonymity, or is anonymous, if for all profiles pi and permutations σ of the set of
voters N , f(piσ) = f(pi) where piσ = (xσ(1), xσ(2), ..., xσ(n)).
That is to say, if a function is anonymous, the order of the voters does not
effect the outcome.
DEFINITION 2.5. An aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} satisfies
Neutrality, or is neutral, if f(−pi) = −f(pi) for all profiles pi = (x1, x2, ..., xn), where−pi = (−x1,−x2, ...,−xn).
If a function in neutral, then the labeling of the alternatives does not effect
the outcome of the voting.
In order to look at the next two axioms, we need to define profile comparisons.
For any two profiles pi = (x1, x2, ..., xn) and pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ..., x′n), pi′ ≥ pi if x′i ≥ xi for
all integers i ∈ N .
DEFINITION 2.6. An aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} satisfies
Monotonicity, or is monotone, if for all profiles pi, pi′, if pi′ ≥ pi then f(pi′) ≥ f(pi).
If a function is monotone, then increasing favor for any alternative will not
negatively effect that alternative’s chance of being chosen.
DEFINITION 2.7. An aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} satisfies
Strict Monotonicity, or is strictly monotone, if f is monotone, and furthermore, if
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pi′ ≥ pi and pi′ ≠ pi, then
f(pi) = 0⇒ f(pi′) = 1 and f(pi′) = 0⇒ f(pi) = −1.
The strict monotonicity condition adds a tie breaking condition to the basic
monotonicity axiom. This tie breaking axiom means that if a profile generates an
output of 0, a tie, and then one voter changes their choice, then that choice will be
the output.
In 1952, Kenneth May completely characterized the class of aggregation func-
tions that satisfy Strict Monotonicity, Neutrality, and Anonymity. It turns out that
this class only contains one function called the simple majority rule function (SMR)
[12]. The definition of (SMR) is given below:
DEFINITION 2.8. An aggregation rule fm ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} is simple ma-
jority rule (SMR), if for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n
fm(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
− 1, n−(pi) > n+(pi),
1, n+(pi) > n−(pi),
0, otherwise.
(2.1)
In 2006, Bonifacio Llamazares extended May’s work by characterizing a wider
class of majority type rules [11]. He introduced a new axiom called cancellation,
which he defined as follows:
DEFINITION 2.9. An aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} satisfies
Cancellation, or is cancellative, if for any profile pi = (x1, x2, ..., xn) such that there
exists i, j ∈ N where xi = 1 and xj = −1, and there exists another profile pi′ =(x′1, x′2, ...x′n) such that x′k = xk for all k ≠ i, j and x′i = x′j = 0 then f(pi) = f(pi′).
The cancellation axiom indicates that a vote of −1 will “cancel out” a vote
of 1.
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Llamazares completely characterized the class of aggregation functions which
satisfy Anonymity, Neutrality, Cancellation, and Monotonicity [11]. He called the
aggregation functions belonging to this class as “difference of votes” rules since the
outputs determined by n+(pi) − n−(pi) or n−(pi) − n+(pi). They are defined below.
DEFINITION 2.10. An aggregation rule f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} is said to be an
Mk rule, if there exists an integer k ∈ [0, n], such that for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n,
Mk(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k,
− 1, n−(pi) > n+(pi) + k,
0, otherwise.
(2.2)
In order to make the understanding completely clear, Llamazares’ Theorem
is stated below.
THEOREM 2.1. If an aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} satisfies
Anonymity, Neutrality, Cancellation, and Monotonicity, then there exists an integer
k in the interval [0, n] such that f(pi) =Mk(pi) for all pi.
The Mk rules are restricted to values of k in the interval [0, n]. If k is neg-
ative, then the resulting function is not well-defined. Also, k is defined to be an
integer, since for any real number j and integer k such that k ≤ j < k + 1, Mj =Mk.
Also for any value k > n, Mk = Mn. Thus to be well-defined and avoid repetition,
we restrict k to the integers in [0, n]. Notice that if k = 0, then M0 = fm.
AN INFINITE VOTING MODEL
We are now ready to introduce our second voting model. In this model, we
consider a countably infinite set of voters. This type of infinite voting model has
been studied by others in the area of voting theory such as Mark Fey [5]. The set
of voters N will be of replaced by N. Here N is defined to be the set of natural
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numbers, {1,2,3, ...}. We will define an aggregation function on a countably infinite
set of voters. We are now ready to extend Definition 2.1 to the countably infinite
set of voters.
DEFINITION 2.11. An infinite aggregation function is any function of the form
f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1}. The function f will take profiles pi = (x1, x2, ...) ∈{−1,0,1}N, where 1,−1 are alternatives and 0 represents abstention or indifference
in the domain and a tie in the output.
We now extend the notation given in Definition 2.2 the set of countable
voters.
DEFINITION 2.12. The set of voters in a profile pi = (x1, x2, ...) who voted for each
alternative will be denoted as follows:
N+(pi) = {i ∈ N ∶ xi = 1}, N−(pi) = {i ∈ N ∶ xi = −1}, and N0(pi) = {i ∈ N ∶ xi = 0}.
Finally, n+(pi) = ∣N+(pi)∣, n−(pi) = ∣N−(pi)∣, and n0(pi) = ∣N0(pi)∣. We will write
n∗(pi) =∞, if n∗(pi) is not finite, and follow the convention that ∞+ k =∞ for any
finite number k.
Here is an example of an infinite aggregation function on a countably infinite
set of voters.
EXAMPLE 2.2. An infinite aggregation rule f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} will be
called an M∞ rule if for all profiles pi, f(pi) =M∞(pi) where
M∞(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1, n+(pi) =∞ and n−(pi) <∞,




Next, we need to extend our axioms to the countably infinite set of voters.
While some of these axioms extend naturally, others require a more careful approach.
Monotonicity, Neutrality, and Cancellation extend quite naturally.
DEFINITION 2.13. An infinite aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is
said to be Neutral, or satisfies neutrality, if f(−pi) = −f(pi) for all pi = (x1, x2, ...) ∈{−1,0,1}N where −pi = (−x1,−x2, ..).
In the countably infinite set of voters, for profiles pi = (x1, x2, ...), pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ...),
we write pi ≥ pi′ if xi ≥ x′i, for all i ∈ N.
DEFINITION 2.14. An infinite aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is
said to be Monotone, or satisfies monotonicity, if for pi, ρ ∈ {−1,0,1}N, pi ≥ ρ implies
f(pi) ≥ f(ρ).
Since cancellation only applies to a finite set within the profile, it extends
easily as well.
DEFINITION 2.15. An infinite aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1}
is said to be Cancellative, or satisfies cancellation, if for pi = (x1, x2, ...), pi′ =(x′1, x′2, ...) ∈ {−1,0,1}N, such that xk = x′k for all k ≠ i, j and xi = 1, xj = −1
and x′i = x′j = 0 implies that f(pi) = f(pi′).
The above three axioms carried over nicely to the countably infinite set from
the finite set of voters; however, there are a number of different types of anonymity
to consider in our second voting model. We will only cover two of them, as they are
the most intuitive.
DEFINITION 2.16. An infinite aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is
said to be Finite Anonymous, or satisfies finite anonymity, if for any permutation
δ of N where ∣{ i ∶ δ(i) ≠ i}∣ < ∞, then f(piδ) = f(pi). We will denote the set of all
such permutations by Σ.
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DEFINITION 2.17. An infinite aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is
said to be Strongly Anonymous,or satisfies strong anonymity, if for any permutation
σ of N, f(piσ) = f(pi).
When looking at infinite aggregation functions, we will also examine a new
axiom that is helpful in understanding these functions. To state this condition, we
say that a subset N of N is co-finite if N c = N/N is finite. For example, N = {x ∈
N ∶ x ≥ 100} is co-finite, since N/N = {x ∈ N ∶ x < 100} is finite. However, the set
2N = {x ∈ N ∶ 2 divides x} is neither finite nor co-finite since N/2N, the set of all
odd natural numbers, is also infinite.
DEFINITION 2.18. An aggregation function f is said to be Zero Co-finite if there
exists a profile pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N, such that N0(pi) is co-finite and f(pi) ≠ 0.
The zero co-finite axiom is not met by the function M∞ defined in Example
2.2, where if only a finite set of the countably infinite subset of N do not abstain, no
winner is chosen. There could be many instances where one would want to choose
a winner even if only finitely many voters cast a vote.
FUZZY VOTING MODEL
Our third voting model involves fuzzy aggregation functions. These functions
are based on two alternatives, x and y, and each voter can choose any number in
the range [0,1], based on how strongly they feel towards one alternative or another.
A vote of 0.5 is complete indifference or abstention, a vote of 1 is complete favor
for y over x, and a vote of 0 is complete favor for x over y. A vote di such that
0.5 < di < 1 shows a level of favor towards y over x, with respect to an abstention.
A vote of 0.75 shows a 50% favor towards y over x. A graduate student in our
original example, with x = coke, y = wine might vote 0.75 if they like wine, but
not coke, but are not necessarily super happy with wine as a choice, because they
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would rather have beer. The output options are either 0, 1 or 0.5, indicating a
choice of x, y, or a tie, respectively. In this model, we will assume the set of voters
is Nm = {1,2, ...,m}, where m ≥ 2 is an integer. It should be observed that 0 in the
first two models corresponds to 12 in this model.
DEFINITION 2.19. A fuzzy aggregation function, or fuzzy decision rule, is a map-
ping F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} that assigns 0,0.5, or 1 to each profile pi = (d1, ..., dm) ∈[0,1]m, depending on whether 0 defeats 1, 0 and 1 tie, or 1 defeats 0, respectively.
In order to help better understand these rules, we will look at the fuzzy
version of simple majority rule defined in Definition 2.8.
EXAMPLE 2.3. An aggregation rule f̃m ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} is fuzzy simple majority














We can extend our axioms, but they will look slightly different in this domain
than in the other two models. Our axioms are the same as those used by Garcia-
Lapresta and Llamazares in their 2010 paper [8]. Anonymity and monotonicity look
similar to the versions of anonymity and monotonicity given in the previous models.
DEFINITION 2.20. A fuzzy aggregation function F ∶ [0,1]m → {0,0.5,1} is Anony-
mous if for all permutations of Nm and all profiles pi = (d1, ..., dm), F (dσ(1), ..., dσ(m)) =
F (d1, ..., dm).
Now, just as in our previous two cases, for any pi = (d1, ..., dm) and pi′ =(d′1, ..., d′m), pi ≥ pi′ if di ≥ d′i for all i ∈ Nm.
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DEFINITION 2.21. A fuzzy aggregation function F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} is Mono-
tone if for all profiles pi and pi′, pi′ ≥ pi⇒ F (pi′) ≥ F (pi).
In order to describe the negative of a profile, we will first define a function
on [0,1].
DEFINITION 2.22. For any d ∈ [0,1], define N(d) = 1 − d. In other words, d +
N(d) = 1 for all d ∈ [0,1].
Now, we can define neutrality in the following way. Since in our previous
models, a vote of 1 was “neutralized” by negating it to −1, since 1 and −1 average
to 0, an abstention. In this model, a vote of d is “neutralized’ by N(d), since they
average to 12 , an abstention in this context.
DEFINITION 2.23. A fuzzy aggregation function F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} is Neutral
if for all profiles (d1, ...dm), F (N(d1), ...,N(dm)) = N(F (d1, ..., dm)).
When we define cancellation, it will look the most different, since the alter-
natives have different labeling. However, the idea is the same.
DEFINITION 2.24. A fuzzy aggregation function F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} is Cancella-
tive if for all pairs of profiles (d1, ...dm), (d′1, ..., d′m) ∈ [0,1]m, such that d′i = di + 
and d′j = dj − , for some i, j ∈ {1, ...,m} and  > 0, and d′k = dk for all k ≠ i, j, it
holds that F (d1, ...dm) = F (d′1, ..., d′m).
We can see, with little proof, that as with the finite aggregation functions, the
fuzzy simple majority rule, f̃m, is anonymous, neutral, monotone and cancellative.
Garcia-Lapresta and Llamazares showed that for fuzzy decisions rules cancellation
completely implies anonymity [8]. We also need to introduce a new axiom for these
rules called Pareto.
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DEFINITION 2.25. A fuzzy aggregation function F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} is Pareto
if
F (1, ...,1) = 1 and F (0, ...,0) = 0.
It is not hard to notice that f̃m is Pareto as well. Garcia-Lapresta and
Llamazares also defined fuzzy difference of votes rules. However, there were two
different variations of these rules [8]. They are listed below.
DEFINITION 2.26. Given a real number k ∈ [0,m), the fuzzy M̃k majority is the





i=1di > 12 + k2m ,
1
2 , if ∣ 1m m∑
i=1di − 12 ∣ ≤ k2m ,
0, if 1m
m∑
i=1di < 12 − k2m .
(2.5)
DEFINITION 2.27. Given a real number k ∈ (0,m], the fuzzy M̃ ′k majority is the





i=1di ≥ 12 + k2m ,
1
2 , if ∣ 1m m∑
i=1di − 12 ∣ < k2m ,
0, if 1m
m∑
i=1di ≤ 12 − k2m .
(2.6)
Though these fuzzy aggregation rules were defined in this way by Garcia-
Lapresta and Llamazares, we will multiply each line through by m, and rewrite





i=1di > 12(m + k),
1
2 , if ∣ m∑
i=1di − m2 ∣ ≤ 12k,
0, if
m∑







i=1di ≥ 12(m + k),
1
2 , if ∣ m∑
i=1di − m2 ∣ < 12k,
0, if
m∑
i=1di ≤ 12(m − k).
(2.8)
While M̃ ′k and M̃k look similar, since the profiles can contain votes that are any real
number, and not just integers, the outputs could vary even with the same profile.
For m = 3 and k = 1, where pi = (23 , 23 , 23), M̃k(pi) = 12 and M̃ ′k(pi) = 1. Notice that
M̃0 = f̃m, the fuzzy simple majority rule.
Now that all of our voting models have been introduced, the next few chapters
will discuss the Mk rules as they behave in each domain. We will highlight some
previous findings, as well as introduce new results in each model that have allowed
us to extend the definition of difference of votes rules in various ways.
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CHAPTER 3
DIFFERENCE OF VOTES RULES ON A FINITE VOTING MODEL
The purpose of this chapter is to look further into the class of difference
of votes rules for finite aggregation rules. We will introduce our version of the
class of difference of votes rules. This class of functions contains both neutral
and non-neutral aggregation functions. We will prove that this class of functions
completely characterizes the set of functions that are cancellative, anonymous, and
monotone. We will then further extend these results, removing anonymity and
looking at aggregations functions that satisfy cancellation and monotonicity and
give a complete characterization of such rules.
First, we will introduce the function that we define as the difference of
votes rules. We will use the symbol Z to denote the set of integers. That is
Z = {...,−2,−1,0,1,2, ...}.
DEFINITION 3.1. An aggregation rule f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} is said to be an
Mk,l rule, if there exists k, l ∈ Z∩[−n−1, n], such that k+l ≥ −1 for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n,
Mk,l(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k,
−1 n−(pi) > n+(pi) + l,
0 otherwise.
(3.1)
In the definition of Mk,l rules, there were restrictions listed on k and l. In
order to understand the necessity of those restrictions, we will look at a lemma that
explains when this class of functions is well-defined.
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LEMMA 3.1. If k, l ∈ Z∩[−n−1, n] then Mk,l is well defined if and only if k+l ≥ −1.
Proof. First, assume k + l ≤ −2, and Mk,l is well-defined. If k < 0 and l < 0, then it
follows for ρ = (0,0, ...0) that n+(ρ) > n−(ρ)+k and n−(ρ) > n+(ρ)+ l, so Mk,l would
not be well defined. Therefore, max{k, l} ≥ 0. Assume without loss of generality
k ≥ 0. Since l ≥ −n − 1 and k + l ≤ −2, it follows that k ≤ −2 − l, so k ≤ n − 1
or k < n. Let pi be a profile such that n+(pi) = k + 1 and n−(pi) = 0. Observe that
n+(pi) > n−(pi)+k and n−(pi) > n+(pi)+l. Therefore, for that same pi both Mk,l(pi) = 1
and Mk,l(pi) = −1 holds true. This is a contradiction, so k + l > −2, hence k + l ≥ −1.
Now, assume that for some k, l, Mk,l is not well-defined. Then there exists
pi such that both n+(pi) ≥ n−(pi) + k + 1 and n−(pi) ≥ n+(pi) + l + 1. Thus k ≤
n+(pi) − n−(pi) − 1 and l ≤ n−(pi) − n+(pi) − 1. Hence k + l ≤ −2.
If k = l, then equation 3.1 is the same equation described by Llamazares [11],
and can be found in Definition 2.1. Since we allow k ≠ l, this is a broader class of
functions. If k = n and l = −n−1, then we get the constant function Mn,−n−1(pi) = −1
for all pi. If k = −n − 1 and l = n, then M−n−1,n(pi) = 1 for all pi. Thus, while the
difference of votes rules defined by Llamazares are neutral aggregation functions,
the class of Mk,l contains some non-neutral aggregation rules. In fact, we can show
that an Mk,l rule is only neutral if k = l.
LEMMA 3.2. The function Mk,l is neutral if and only if k = l.
Proof. If k = l, then since k + l > −2, 2k > −1, and k ≥ 0. Therefore, by definition,
we have an Mk rule which is neutral by Theorem 2.1.
Now, assume that Mk,l is neutral. Then anonymity and neutrality allow us
to see that Mk,l(0,0,0, ...) = 0, so k ≥ 0 and l ≥ 0.
If k < n, then consider a profile pi such that n+(pi) = k+1 and n−(pi) = 0, then
Mk,l(pi) = 1. By neutrality, Mk,l(−pi) = −1, where n−(−pi) = k + 1 and n+(−pi) = 0.
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Therefore, k + 1 > n+(−pi) + l = l. Thus k ≥ l. Similarly, if l < n consider ρ such that
n−(ρ) = l + 1 and n+(ρ) = 0, then Mk,l(ρ) = −1. Considering −ρ, n+(−ρ) = l + 1 and
n−(−ρ) = 0, and by neutrality Mk,l(−ρ) = 1. Therefore, l + 1 > n−(−ρ) + k = k, so
l ≥ k. Thus, it follows that k = l.
We will look at an example to help understand the motivation and workings
of this class of functions.
EXAMPLE 3.1. Suppose there is a committee in the Senate of ten Senators, and
in order to overturn an old decision, they want a super-majority. It is common that
Senators are out of town from time to time. To insure that such decisions are not
made when only a few Senators are there, they develop an aggregation rule that in
order to overturn a previous decision the difference between those in favor and those
against must be greater than 3. Formally, if 1 represents a decision being overturned
and −1 represents keeping the old decision, then 1 wins if n+(pi) > n−(pi) + 3. The
senators’ aggregation rule is the Mk,l rule with n = 10 and defined by:
M3,−4(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 n+(pi) > n−(pi) + 3,
−1 n−(pi) > n+(pi) − 4,
0 otherwise.
(3.2)
When 6 Senators vote, the only way to get an output of 1 and overturn the ruling
would be to have 5 or 6 votes in favor. Since n+(pi) = 5 > n−(pi) + 3 and n+(pi) =
6 > n−(pi) + 3. Otherwise, 2 or more “no”’s will result in not changing the rule, as
n−(pi) = 2 > n+(pi) − 4. With 4 or 5 Senators voting, it would require all present
to vote in favor of overturning the rule in order to do so. If 3 or fewer Senators
are voting, the rule cannot pass. With all 10 voting, the order would require 7 or
more in favor to pass, but one abstention will actually lower the threshold to 6. This
voting rule also prevents Senators from abstaining in order to prevent decisions, as
it would require half of the committee to abstain to insure there is no change made.
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It is notable that the aggregation function defined in Example 3.1 cannot
output 0. This happens to be specific to the relationship between k and l. It turns
out that an Mk,l rule cannot output 0 when their sum is minimal. This occurs when
k + l = −1.
PROPOSITION 3.1. For any Mk,l, k + l = −1 if and only if Mk,l(pi) ≠ 0 for any
pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n.
Proof. First, if l + k = −1, then assume, by way of contradiction, that there exists
ρ ∈ {−1,0,1}n such that Mk,l(ρ) = 0. Then n+(ρ) ≤ n−(ρ) + k and n−(ρ) ≤ n+(ρ) + l.
Thus, n+(ρ) ≤ n+(ρ)+l+k, and so 0 ≤ l+k. This contradicts that l+k = −1, therefore,
Mk,l(pi) ≠ 0 for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n.
Next, assume that there exists an Mk,l rule such that Mk,l(pi) ≠ 0 for any
pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n. First notice that if k = −n−1, then Mk,l(pi) = 1 for all pi. In order for
Mk,l to be well defined, l = n. Similarly, if l = −n−1, then k = n. Thus, we can assume
k > −n−1. Now for any pi, either n+(pi) > n−(pi)+k or n−(pi) > n+(pi)+ l. Since both
cannot hold at the same time, assume pi is such that n+(pi) − n−(pi) = k + 1. Then
Mk,l(pi) = 1. Consider pi′ such that n+(pi′) − n−(pi′) = k. Then n+(pi′) /> n−(pi′) + k,
so Mk,l(pi′) ≠ 1. Hence, Mk,l(pi′) = −1, since there exists no profile pi such that
Mk,l(pi) = 0. Therefore, n−(pi′) > n+(pi′) + l, which implies n−(pi′) − n+(pi′) > l.
Thus −k > l or k + l < 0. Since we already showed that k + l ≥ −1, it is clear that
k + l = −1.
Even though Mk,l rules are not neutral, there is a relationship between Mk,l
and Ml,k that extends neutrality.
PROPOSITION 3.2. For any k, l ∈ Z ∩ [−n − 1, n] such that k ≠ l and k + l ≥ −1,
and any pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n, Mk,l(−pi) = −Ml,k(pi) or Mk,l(pi) = −Ml,k(−pi).
Proof. Let Mk,l(pi) = 1, then n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k. Thus, n−(−pi) > n+(−pi) + k, so
Ml,k(−pi) = −1. Similarly, if Mk,l(pi) = −1, then n−(pi) > n+(pi) + l. Then n+(−pi) >
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n−(−pi)+l, hence Ml,k(−pi) = 1. Lastly, if Mk,l = 0, then neither n+(pi) > n−(pi)+k nor
n−(pi) > n+(pi) + l. Therefore neither n−(−pi) > n+(−pi) + k nor n+(−pi) > n−(−pi) + l.
Thus Ml,k(−pi) = 0. Hence Mk,l(pi) = −Ml,k(−pi).
Now that we have a basic understanding of the roles of k and l, we can look
at which axioms from Chapter 2 the Mk,l rules satisfy. The first theorem we have
shows that Mk,l rules where k ≠ l satisfy all of the axioms that Mk rules satisfy,
with the exception of neutrality.
THEOREM 3.1. For any k, l ∈ Z ∩ [−n − 1, n] such that k ≠ l and k + l ≥ −1 the
function Mk,l ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} is anonymous, cancellative, monotone, but is
not neutral.
Proof. Notice that for any permutation σ of N and pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n, n+(pi) = n+(piσ)
and n−(pi) = n−(piσ). Therefore, Mk,l(pi) =Mk,l(piσ). Hence, Mk,l is anonymous.
Let pi = (x1, x2, ..., xn) and pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ..., x′n) be profiles such that xk =
x′k for all k ≠ i, j, xi = 1, xj = −1 and x′i = x′j = 0, then N+(pi′) = N+(pi)/{i}
and N−(pi′) = N−(pi)/{j}. If Mk,l(pi) = 1, then n+(pi) − n−(pi) > k. In this case
n+(pi′) − n−(pi′) = n+(pi) − n−(pi) − 1 + 1 > k. Hence Mk,l(pi′) = 0. Alternatively, if
Mk,l(pi) = −1, then n−(pi) − n+(pi) > l and n−(pi′) − n+(pi′) > l. Hence Mk,l(pi′) = −1.
By completeness, if Mk,l(pi) = 0, then Mk,l(pi′) = 0. Thus Mk,l is cancellative.
Next, consider two profiles pi and pi′ such that pi ≤ pi′ and Mk,l(pi) = 1, so
n+(pi) > n−(pi)+k. Then N+(pi) ⊆ N+(pi′)and N−(pi′) ⊆ N−(pi). Thus n+(pi′) ≥ n+(pi)
and n−(pi′) ≤ n−(pi). Hence, n+(pi′) > n−(pi′) + k, implies Mk,l(pi′) = 1. Similarly, if
ρ and ρ′ are such that ρ ≥ ρ′ and Mk,l(ρ) = −1, then n−(ρ) > n+(ρ) + l. It follows
that N−(ρ) ⊆ N−(ρ′)and N+(ρ′) ⊆ N+(ρ). Thus n−(ρ′) > n−(ρ) and n+(ρ′) < n+(ρ),
so Mk,l(ρ′) = −1 and Mk,l is monotone.
By Lemma 3.2, since k ≠ l Mk,l is not neutral.
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Now that we have proven that Mk,l rules are anonymous, cancellative, and
monotone, our next step is show that this class of functions completely characterize
all functions that satisfy these three axioms. We start by proving the following:
THEOREM 3.2. An aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} satisfies anonymity,
cancellation, monotonicity and is not neutral if and only if there exists k, l ∈ Z ∩[−n − 1, n] such that k ≠ l and k + l ≥ −1 such that f =Mk,l.
Proof. Assume that f satisfies our four conditions. We will define the integers k
and l in the following ways. If f(pi) ≠ 1 for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n, let k = n; otherwise,
let
k = min{n+(pi) − n−(pi) ∶ f(pi) = 1} − 1.
Similarly, if f(pi) ≠ −1 for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n, let l = n; otherwise, let
l = min{n−(pi) − n+(pi) ∶ f(pi) = −1} − 1.
Notice that k, l ∈ Z ∩ [−n − 1, n]. If k < n, then let κ be a profile such that n+(κ) −
n−(κ) = k+1 and f(κ) = 1. If l < n, then let λ be a profile such that n−(λ)−n+(λ) =
l + 1. Our first goal is to verify that k + l ≥ −1. If k = n, then since l ≥ −n − 1,
k + l ≥ −1. Similarly, if l = n, then k + l ≥ −1. Thus, from now on we will assume
that k < n and l < n. Since f is cancellative, we may assume that κ satisfies one of
the follow equations:
n+(κ) = 0 and n−(κ) = −k − 1, (3.3)
or
n−(κ) = 0 and n+(κ) = k + 1. (3.4)
Similarly, we may assume that λ satisfies one of the follow equations:
n+(λ) = 0 and n−(λ) = l + 1, (3.5)
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or
n−(λ) = 0 and n+(λ) = −l − 1. (3.6)
Suppose Equations (3.3) and (3.6) hold. Then 0⃗ ≥ κ and 0⃗ ≤ λ. By mono-
tonicity, f(0⃗) ≥ f(κ) = 1 and f(0⃗) ≤ f(λ) = −1, which is impossible. Thus Equations
(3.3) and (3.6) cannot hold at the same time.
We cannot have k = l = −1, since then κ = λ = 0⃗ and f(κ) = 1, but f(λ) = −1.
Therefore, if Equations (3.4) and (3.5) hold then k + 1 ≥ 0 and l + 1 ≥ 0. So k ≥ −1
and l ≥ −1. Since k = l = −1 is impossible, it follows that k + l ≥ −1.
If Equation (3.3) and (3.5) hold, then n+(κ) = n+(λ) = 0. Since n−(κ) ≥ 0,
we know that −k − 1 ≥ 0. Similarly, l + 1 ≥ 0. But f is monotone, and f(λ) < f(κ),
so λ < κ. That implies that l + 1 > −k − 1 or l + k > −2; hence, l + k ≥ −1.
If Equations (3.4) and (3.6) hold, then n−(κ) = n−(λ) = 0 and we can argue
like above that
k + 1 > −l − 1 and so k + l ≥ −1.
At this point, by Lemma 3.1, the Mk,l rule is well defined.
Now, let f(pi) = 1. Then n+(pi) − n−(pi) > k by the definition of k. Thus
n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k, so Mk,l(pi) = 1. Similarly, let f(pi) = −1. Then n−(pi) − n+(pi) > l
by the definition of l. So, n−(pi) > n+(pi) + l and Mk,l(pi) = −1.
Next, assume that Mk,l(pi) = 1. We will show that f(pi) = 1. Now Mk,l(pi) = 1
implies that n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k. So n+(pi) − n−(pi) > k. Since Mk,l is cancellative,
there exists pi′ such that Mk,l(pi′) =Mk,l(pi) and one of the following holds:
n+(pi′) = 0 and − n−(pi′) > k, (3.7)
or
n−(pi′) = 0 and n+(pi′) > k. (3.8)
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Therefore there are four cases to analyze.
1. Assume Equations (3.3) and (3.7) hold. Then n+(κ) = n+(pi) = 0, n−(κ) =−k − 1 and n−(pi′) ≤ −k − 1. Since n−(pi′) ≤ n−(κ) and n+(κ) = n+(pi) = 0, there
exists a permutation σ of N such that κ ≤ pi′σ. Therefore, by the monotonicity
and anonymity, f(κ) ≤ f(pi′) = 1. Since f is cancellative, f(pi′) = f(pi) = 1.
2. Assume Equations (3.4) and (3.7) hold. Therefore, n−(κ) = n+(pi′) = 0,
n+(κ) = k + 1 and n−(pi′) ≤ −k − 1. We find then,
k + 1 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ −k − 1,
k ≥ −1 and k ≤ −1.
So k = −1 and κ = pi′ = 0⃗, so f(κ) = f(pi′) = 1. Since f is cancellative,
f(pi′) = f(pi) = 1.
3. Assume Equations (3.3) and (3.8) hold. Then n−(pi′) = n+(κ) = 0, n+(pi′) > k
and n−(κ) = −k − 1. There exists a permutation σ of N such that pi′σ ≥ κ.
Therefore, by monotonicity, f(pi′σ) ≥ f(κ) = 1. Since f is anonymous and
cancellative, f(pi) = f(pi′) = f(pi′σ) = 1.
4. Assume Equations (3.4) and (3.8) hold. Then n−(pi′) = n−(κ) = 0, n+(pi′) > k
and n+(κ) = k + 1. Using anonymity, if necessary, we can assume that pi′ ≥ κ,
so by monotonicity and cancellation, f(pi′) = f(pi) = 1.
Now, assume that Mk,l(pi) = −1. We will show that f(pi) = −1. Keeping in
mind that Mk,l is cancellative, we may simplify the profile pi by canceling pairs of
the form (−1,1) or (1,−1) to create pi′ as above such that Mk,l(pi′) = −1 and one of
the following holds:
n+(pi′) = 0 and n−(pi′) > l, (3.9)
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or
n−(pi′) = 0 and − n+(pi′) > l. (3.10)
Therefore, we can compare λ and pi′ with four cases as above.
1. Assume Equations (3.5) and (3.9) hold. Then n+(λ) = n+(pi′) = 0, n−(λ) = l+1
and n−(pi′) ≥ l + 1. So, by anonymity, if necessary, we may assume that pi′ ≤ λ
and by monotonicity and cancellation f(pi) = f(pi′) ≤ f(λ) = −1.
2. Assume Equations (3.5) and (3.10) hold. Therefore, n+(λ) = n−(pi′) = 0,
n−(λ) = l + 1 and n−(pi′) ≤ −l − 1. We find then,
l + 1 ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ −l − 1
l ≥ −1 and l ≤ −1
So l = −1 and λ = pi′ = 0⃗, so f(λ) = f(pi′) = −1. Since f is cancellative,
f(pi′) = f(pi) = −1.
3. Assume Equations (3.6) and (3.9) hold. Then n+(pi′) = n−(λ) = 0, n−(pi′) ≥ l+1
and n+(λ) = −l − 1. Now, −l − 1 ≥ 0 implies l ≤ −1. By using anonymity, if
necessary, we may assume that pi′ ≤ λ, so by monotonicity and cancellation,
we can find that f(pi) = f(pi′) ≤ f(λ) = −1.
4. Assume Equations (3.6) and (3.10) hold. Then n−(pi′) = n−(λ) = 0, n+(pi′) ≤−l−1 and n+(λ) = −l−1. Using anonymity, if necessary, we can see that pi′ ≤ λ,
so by monotonicity and cancellation f(pi′) = f(pi) = −1.
Thus, we have shown that for any pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n, f(pi) = 1 if and only if Mk,l(pi) = 1
and f(pi) = −1 if and only if Mk,l(pi) = −1. Therefore, it can be concluded that
f(pi) = 0 if and only if Mk,l(pi) = 0. So f =Mk,l.
25
From our results above and those outlined in Theorem 2.1, we have the
following corollary. This corollary is the complete characterization of aggregation
functions that are monotone, anonymous and cancellative.
COROLLARY 3.1. An aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} satisfies
monotonicity, anonymity, and cancellation if and only if there exists k, l ∈ Z∩ [−n−
1, n] such that k + l ≥ −1 and f =Mk,l
In order to show the necessity of each of our axioms, we will look at a few
examples. In Llamazares’ paper, he gives examples of functions are given that are
neutral as well as satisfying various other axioms[11]. Also, note that the example
given by Llamazares as monotone, anonymous, and cancellative, but not neutral
(labeled SWP #2) is an Mk,l rule where k = n − 2 and l = n − 1. The next two
examples are not neutral by Lemma 3.2. First we will define a function that satisfies
anonymity and monotonicity, but is not cancellative.
EXAMPLE 3.2. Consider the aggregation function H ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1}, for
n ≥ 5, defined by
H(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
M1,3(pi), n+(pi) ≥ 4 or n−(pi) ≥ 4,
0, otherwise.
(3.11)
We will prove that the aggregation function H is anonymous, monotone, but is not
cancellative.
Proof. First, we will show that H is not cancellative. Consider the profiles pi =(x1, x2, ..., xn) and pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ..., x′n) such that n+(pi) = 4, n−(pi) = 1. Then H(pi) =
1, since n+(pi) − n−(pi) = 3 > 1 and n+(pi) ≥ 4. Define pi′ via xk = x′k for all k ≠ i, j
and xi = 1, xj = −1 with x′i = x′j = 0. Then H(pi′) = 0, since n+(pi′) = 3 and n−(pi) = 0.
Therefore, since H(pi) ≠H(pi′), H is not cancellative.
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For n+(pi) ≥ 4 or n−(pi) ≥ 4, H is anonymous, since H(pi) =M1,3(pi) and Mk,l
rules are anonymous. If n+(pi) < 4 and n−(pi) < 4, then H(pi) = 0 is anonymous.
Now, to show that H is monotone, let ρ and ρ′ be profiles such that ρ′ ≥ ρ.
If n+(ρ) ≥ 4 or n−(ρ′) ≥ 4, then H(ρ′) = M1,3(ρ′) ≥ M1,3(ρ) = H(ρ). If n+(ρ′) < 4
or n−(ρ) < 4, then H(ρ′) = 0 ≥ 0 = H(ρ). So we need only to compare two profiles
where one meets the criteria for M1,3 and one meets the criteria for the trivial part
of H.
Let ρ and ρ′ be profiles such that n+(ρ) ≤ 3, n−(ρ) ≤ 3 and ρ′ ≥ ρ. Thus
H(ρ) = 0. Since ρ′ ≥ ρ, n+(ρ′) ≥ n+(ρ) and n−(ρ′) ≤ n−(ρ) ≤ 3. If n+(ρ′) ≥ 4, then
H(ρ′) = 1. If n+(ρ′) ≤ 3, then H(ρ′) = 0. Hence H(ρ′) ≥ H(ρ). Now, let pi′ and pi
be such that n+(pi) ≤ 3, n−(pi) ≤ 3 and pi ≥ pi′. So H(pi) = 0. Also, n−(pi′) ≥ 3 and
n+(pi′) ≤ 3. Thus, H(pi′) ≤ 0 and H(pi′) ≤ H(pi). Hence, we have confirmed that H
is monotone.
The aggregation function defined in the next example is cancellative and
anonymous, but is not monotone.




−1, n+(pi) > n−(pi) + 1,
1, n−(pi) > n+(pi) + 3,
0, otherwise.
(3.12)
We will show that −M1,3 is cancellative, anonymous, but not monotone.
Proof. It follows that −M1,3 is not neutral as well. Since the output is determined
by n−(pi) and n+(pi), −M1,3 is anonymous. Let pi be a profile such that pi(i) = −1
and pi(j) = 1. Consider pi′ such that pi′(i) = pi′(j) = 0 and pi′(k) = pi(k) for all
k ≠ i, j. We know that M1,3(pi) = M1,3(pi′), so −M1,3(pi) = −M1,3(pi′). Thus, −M1,3
is cancellative.
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Lastly, consider pi ≤ ρ, such that n+(pi) = n−(pi) = 0, n+(ρ) = 3 and n−(ρ) = 0.
In this case, −M1,3(pi) = 0 and −M1,3(ρ) = −1. Hence −M1,3(pi) /≤ −M1,3(ρ). So−M1,3 is not monotone.
In order to look at aggregation functions that are not anonymous, we have
to introduce some new subsets of the domain. We define the set U as follows:
U+ = {pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n ∶ n+(pi) = n − 1 and n−(pi) = 0},
U− = {pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n ∶ n−(pi) = n − 1 and n+(pi) = 0},
U = U+ ∪U−.
There is a close interaction between cancellation and anonymity, as Llamazares
stated this in his result [11].
THEOREM 3.3. Let f be aggregation function that satisfies cancellation. Then for
any profile pi such that pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n/U and any permutation σ of N , f(piσ) = f(pi).
Additionally, we can take this a step further and understand what happens
on subsets U+ and U−, if a function is cancellative, but not anonymous.
COROLLARY 3.2. Let f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} be cancellative, monotone, but
not anonymous, then f is non-constant on U+ or U− or both.
Proof. Since f is cancellative, f is anonymous on {−1,0,1}n/U. Since f is not
anonymous there exist pi,pi′ such that n+(pi) = n+(pi′) and n−(pi) = n−(pi′) but
f(pi) ≠ f(pi′). Therefore, pi,pi′ ∈ U+ or pi,pi′ ∈ U−. Hence f is not constant on U+ or
U−.
Therefore, we have three possibilities to consider if f is not anonymous. We
will start with a lemma to help understand the interaction between cancellation and
monotonicity.
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LEMMA 3.3. Let f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} be an aggregation function satisfying
cancellation and monotonicity. For any profiles pi and ρ, if
n+(pi) < n+(ρ) and n−(ρ) ≤ n−(pi), (3.13)
or
n+(pi) ≤ n+(ρ) and n−(ρ) < n−(pi), (3.14)
then f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
Proof. Assume that f satisfies cancellation and monotonicity. Let pi, ρ be profiles
such that n+(pi) < n+(ρ) and n−(ρ) ≤ n−(pi) or n+(pi) ≤ n+(ρ) and n−(ρ) < n−(pi).
Then, since either n+(pi) ≠ n+(ρ) or n−(pi) ≠ n−(ρ) or both, we know that pi and ρ
are not both elements of U− or both elements of U+. Therefore, we have four cases.
Case 1: Neither pi or ρ are in U. Then f is anonymous on {−1,0,1}/U, so there exists
pi′ such that n+(pi′) = n+(pi), n−(pi′) = n−(pi), and pi′ ≤ ρ. Thus f(pi′) ≤ f(ρ)
by monotonicity, and f(pi′) = f(pi) by anonymity. Thus f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
Case 2: The profile pi ∈ U and the profile ρ /∈ U. We can choose ρ′ such that n+(ρ′) =
n+(ρ) and n−(ρ′) = n−(ρ). Additionally, if Equation (3.13) holds, then pick ρ′
such that N+(pi) ⊂ N+(ρ′) and N−(ρ′) ⊆ N−(pi), and if Equation (3.14) hold,
then N+(pi) ⊆ N+(ρ′) and N−(ρ′) ⊂ N−(pi). Since ρ, ρ′ /∈ U, f(ρ) = f(ρ′) by
anonymity. By choice of ρ′, pi ≤ ρ′, so f(pi) ≤ f(ρ′). Thus, f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
Case 3: The profile ρ ∈ U and the profile pi /∈ U. We can choose pi′ such that N+(pi′) ⊂
N+(ρ) and N−(ρ) ⊆ N−(pi′) or N+(pi′) ⊆ N+(ρ) and N−(ρ) ⊂ N−(pi′). Since
pi, pi′ /∈ U, f(pi) = f(pi′) by anonymity. By choice of pi′, pi′ ≤ ρ′, so f(pi′) ≤ f(ρ).
Thus, f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
Case 4: The profile pi ∈ U− and the profile ρ ∈ U+. We can easily see that pi < ρ.
Therefore, by monotonicity, f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
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If ρ ∈ U− and pi ∈ U+, then it could not hold that n+(pi) ≤ n+(ρ). Hence we have
exhausted our case analysis, so f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
We can think of the conditions found in Equations (3.13) and (3.14) implying
f(pi) ≤ f(ρ) as a weak anonymously monotone condition.
Now we will explore which aggregation functions are cancellative and mono-
tone, but not anonymous, looking first at what happens with f is not constant on
both U+ and U−.
THEOREM 3.4. Let f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} be cancellative, monotone and non-
constant on both U+ and U−. Then for all pi /∈ U,
f(pi) =Mn−1, n−1(pi).
Proof. Given that f satisfies the hypothesis of our theorem, there exist profiles pi,pi′
that are both in U+, such that f(pi) = 1 and f(pi′) = 0. If f(χ) = −1 for any profile
χ ∈ U+, then by monotonicity, f(α) = −1 for all α ∈ U−. However, f is non-constant
on U−, so no such χ exists. Similarly, there exists profiles ρ, ρ′ that are both in U−,
such that f(ρ) = −1 and f(ρ′) = 0. If there exists α = (x1, x2, ..., xn) ∈ U− such that
f(α) = 1, then by monotonicity f(χ) = 1 for all χ ∈ U+. However, f is not constant
on U+, so no such α exists.
Next, consider E+. Since E+ > pi, by monotonicity f(E+) ≥ f(pi) = 1. So
f(E+) = 1. Also, consider E−. Since E− < ρ, by monotonicity f(E−) ≤ f(ρ) = −1.
So f(E−) = −1.
Notice, if n+(α) = n−1 and n−(α) = 1, then there exists i, j ∈ [1, n] such that
xi = 1 and xj = −1. Thus, we can create α′ = (x′1, x′2, ..., x′n) such that x′i = x′j = 0
and x′k = xk for all k ≠ i, j. Then n+(α′) = n − 2 and n−(α′) = 0. By cancellation
f(α) = f(α′). Similarly, if n−(α) = n − 1 and n+(α) = 1, we could follow the same
process to show that f(α) = f(α′) for α′ such that n−(α′) = n − 2 and n+(α′) = 0.
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Now, to consider all profiles not in U and E+ or E−, we assume that α is a
profile such that n+(α) ≤ n − 2 and n−(α) ≤ n − 2. First, we will compare α to pi′
from above. Since pi′ ∈ U+, n+(pi′) = n−1 and n−(pi′) = 0. Therefore, by Lemma 3.3,
f(α) ≤ f(pi′) = 0. Thus f(α) ≤ 0. Next, we will compare α to ρ′ from above. Since
ρ′ ∈ U−, n−(ρ′) = n − 1 and n+(ρ′) = 0. Therefore, by Lemma 3.3, f(α) ≥ f(ρ′) = 0.
Thus f(α) ≥ 0. Hence f(α) = 0.
Thus for pi /∈ U, f(pi) =Mn−1, n−1(pi).
Secondly, we will look at the aggregation rules that are constant on U+, but non-
constant on U−.
THEOREM 3.5. Let f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} be cancellative, monotone, and
constant on U+, but non-constant on U−. Then for any profile ρ not belonging to
U−,
f(ρ) =Mk,l(ρ)
where l = n + f(E−),
and
k =min{n + 1, n+(pi) − n−(pi) ∶ pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n and f(pi) = 1} − 1.
Proof. Since f is monotone and not constant on U− it follows that f(E−) ≠ 1.
Therefore, f(E−) = 0 or f(E−) = −1. This in turn implies that l = n + f(E−) ∈{n,n − 1}.
Case 1: Assume that f(E−) = 0. Then l = n. By monotonicity, f(pi) ≥ 0 for
any profile pi. Since f is not constant on U−, there exists pi′ ∈ U− such that f(pi′) = 1.
Notice that n+(pi′)−n−(pi′) = −n+1 and so k = −n. Let ρ be a profile not belonging to
U− and assume that ρ ≠ E−. Then either n−(ρ) ≤ n−2 or n−(ρ) = n−1 and n+(ρ) = 1.
In either case, observe that for profiles pi′ and ρ either Equation (3.13) or (3.14)
holds. By Lemma 3.3, f(pi′) ≤ f(ρ) and so f(ρ) = 1. Since n+(ρ) − n−(ρ) ≥ −n + 2,
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it follows that Mk,l(ρ) = M−n,n(ρ) = 1. We have that f(ρ) = Mk,l(ρ) where k = −n
and l = n.
Case 2: Assume that f(E−) = −1. Then l = n − 1. Choose a profile pi′
belonging to U− such that f(pi′) ≥ f(pi′′) for all pi′′ ∈ U−. Since f is non-constant
on U−, f(pi′) ≥ 0. If f(pi′) = 1, then k = −n and the argument in Case 1 shows that
f(ρ) = Mk,l(ρ) where k = −n and l = n − 1, for all profiles ρ not belonging to U−.
Now, we can assume that f(pi′) = 0. In other words, f(pi′′) ≤ 0 for all pi′′ belonging
to U−.
We define f˜ ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} by
f˜(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if pi ∈ U−,
f(pi) otherwise. (3.15)
Since both f and the zero function are monotone and cancellative, and f(E−) = −1,
f˜ is monotone and cancellative. Since f˜ is constant on U− and U+, f˜ is anonymous.
Therefore, from Theorem 3.2 and its proof, f˜ =Mk′,l′ such that
k′ =min{n + 1, n+(pi) − n−(pi) ∶ pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n and f˜(pi) = 1} − 1
and
l′ =min{n + 1, n−(pi) − n+(pi) ∶ pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n and f˜(pi) = −1} − 1.
Since f˜(E−) = f(E−) = −1 and f(pi′′) ≤ f˜(pi′′) = 0 for all pi′′ belonging to U−, it
follows that f˜(pi) = 1 if and only if f(pi) = 1. Thus, k′ = min{n + 1, n+(pi) − n−(pi) ∶
pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n and f(pi) = 1} − 1, so k′ = k. Since f˜(E−) = −1, l′ ≤ n − 1, since
f˜(pi) = 0 for all pi ∈ U− and f˜ is monotone, l′ ≥ n − 1. Thus l′ = n − 1. Since
f(ρ) = f˜(ρ) = Mk′,l′ for all ρ /∈ U−, l = l′, and k′ = k, then f(ρ) = Mk,l(ρ) with
k = min{n + 1, n+(pi) − n−(pi) ∶ pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n and f(pi) = 1} − 1 and l = n − 1 for all
ρ not belonging to U−. Therefore, f(pi) =Mk,n+f(E−)(pi) for all pi not in U−.
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Now, we will look at the possibility that f is constant on U−, but non-constant
on U+.
THEOREM 3.6. Let f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} be cancellative, monotone, constant
on U−, and non-constant on U+. Then for any profile ρ not belonging to U+,
f(ρ) =Mk,l(ρ)
where k = n − f(E+) and
l =min{n + 1, n−(pi) − n+(pi) ∶ pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n and f(pi) = −1} − 1.
Proof. Let f be cancellative, monotone, constant on U−, and non-constant on U+.
Define fˆ ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} as
fˆ(pi) = −f(−pi). (3.16)
Since pi ∈ U+ if and only if −pi ∈ U−, then fˆ is constant on U+ and non-constant on
U−. If f(−pi) = 1, then fˆ(pi) = −1. If f(−pi) = −1, then fˆ(pi) = 1. Suppose pi ≤ pi′,
then −pi ≥ −pi′. Since f is monotone, f(−pi) ≥ f(−pi′), so fˆ(pi) = −f(−pi) ≤ −f(−pi′) =
fˆ(pi′). We now know that fˆ is monotone.
If pi,pi′ are profiles such that N+(pi) ⊂ N+(pi′), N−(pi) ⊂ N−(pi′), n+(pi) =
n+(pi′) − 1 and n−(pi) = n−(pi′) − 1, then since f is cancellative, f(−pi) = f(−pi′), so
fˆ(pi) = −f(−pi) = −f(−pi′) = fˆ(pi′). Hence fˆ is monotone and cancellative, as well.
Thus, by Theorem 3.5, fˆ is an Mk′,n+fˆ(E−) rule, where k′ =min{n+1, n+(pi)−n−(pi) ∶





k′ =min{n + 1, n+(−pi) − n−(−pi) ∶ pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n and f(−pi) = −1} − 1
=min{n + 1, n−(pi) − n+(pi) ∶ pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n and f(pi) = −1} − 1.
Hence k′ = l. Furthermore, f =Mn−f(E+), l where
l =min{n + 1, n−(pi) − n+(pi) ∶ pi ∈ {−1,0,1}n and f(pi) = −1} − 1.
The next step to completely characterize anonymous and cancellative aggre-
gation functions is to prove the converses of the above three theorems. Now, we
will state and prove the converse of Theorem 3.4.
THEOREM 3.7. Let φ+ ∶ U+ → {0,1} and φ− ∶ U− → {−1,0} be any two non-constant
mappings. The function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} defined by
f(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ+(pi) pi ∈ U+,
φ−(pi) pi ∈ U−,
Mn−1,n−1(pi) otherwise,
satisfies cancellation, monotonicity, but not anonymity.
Proof. Since φ+ is non-constant on U+ and φ− is non-constant on U−, thus f is not
anonymous. Let pi be a profile such that pi(i) = −1 and pi(j) = 1. Consider pi′ such
that pi′(i) = pi′(j) = 0 and pi′(k) = pi(k) for all k ≠ i, j. Thus neither pi nor pi′ are
elements of U, so f(pi) =Mn−1,n−1(pi) =Mn−1,n−1(pi′) = f(pi′). Thus f is cancellative.
In order to show monotonicity, consider pi ≤ ρ, then both profiles cannot be
in U+ and both profiles cannot be in U−, so we have five cases.
Case 1: If pi ∈ U+ then f(pi) = 0 or f(pi) = 1. Since ρ ≥ pi, either ρ = pi or ρ = E+.
Since f(E+) =Mn−1,n−1(E+) = 1, f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
Case 2: If pi ∈ U− then f(pi) = 0 or f(pi) = −1. Since ρ ≥ pi, either ρ = pi or ρ > pi.
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For all ρ > pi, f(ρ) = 0 or f(ρ) = 1. Hence, f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
Case 3: If ρ ∈ U+ then f(ρ) = 0 or f(ρ) = 1. Either ρ = pi or ρ > pi. For all pi < ρ,
either f(pi) = 0 or f(pi) = −1. So f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
Case 4: If ρ ∈ U− then f(ρ) = 0 or f(ρ) = −1. Either ρ = pi or pi = E−. Since
f(E−) =Mn−1,n−1(E−) = −1, f(pi) ≤ f(ρ).
Case 5: If neither pi nor ρ are in U. Then f(pi) =Mn−1,n−1(pi) ≤Mn−1,n−1(ρ) = f(ρ).
Therefore, f is monotone.
Next, to look at the converse of Theorem 3.5, we will state three separate
theorems, as there are multiple functions that need to be verified as monotone,
cancellative, but not anonymous.
THEOREM 3.8. Let φ−1 ∶ U− → {0,1} be any surjective mapping and let l be an
integer such that l ∈ [n,n − 1]. The function f1 ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} defined by
f1(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ−1(pi) pi ∈ U−,
M−n,l(pi) otherwise,
satisfies cancellation, monotonicity, but not anonymity.
THEOREM 3.9. Let φ−2 ∶ U− → {−1,0,1} be any surjective mapping. The function
f2 ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} defined by
f2(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ−2(pi) pi ∈ U−,
M−n,n−1(pi) otherwise,
satisfies cancellation, monotonicity, but not anonymity.
THEOREM 3.10. Let φ−3 ∶ U− → {−1,0} be any surjective mapping, and let k be an
integer such that k ∈ [−n+ 1, n]. The function f3 ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} defined by
f3(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ−3(pi) pi ∈ U−,
Mk,n−1(pi) otherwise,
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satisfies cancellation, monotonicity, but not anonymity.
Proof. We will prove all of the above three theorems concurrently. Since φ−1 , φ−2 ,
and φ−3 are defined to be non-constant on U−, the functions f1, f2, and f3 are not
anonymous. Let pi be a profile such that pi(i) = −1 and pi(j) = 1. Consider pi′
such that pi′(i) = pi′(j) = 0 and pi′(k) = pi(k) for all k ≠ i, j. Thus neither pi nor pi′
are elements of U, so f1(pi) = M−n,l(pi) = M−n,l(pi′) = f1(pi′), f2(pi) = M−n,n−1(pi) =
M−n,n−1(pi′) = f2(pi′), and f3(pi) =Mk,n−1(pi) =Mk,n−1(pi′) = f3(pi′). Thus f1, f2, and
f3 are cancellative.
In order to show monotonicity, consider pi ≤ ρ, then both profiles cannot be
in U− unless pi = ρ. If pi = ρ then f1(pi) = f1(ρ), f2(pi) = f2(ρ), and f3(pi) = f3(ρ).
We will assume pi < ρ and consider three cases.
Case 1: Assume pi ∈ U−. Now pi ∈ U− along with ρ > pi implies that n+(ρ) −
n−(ρ) ≥ −n + 2, and so
f1(ρ) =M−n,l(ρ) = 1 and f2(ρ) =M−n,n−1(ρ) = 1
Hence, f1(pi) ≤ f1(ρ) and f2(pi) ≤ f2(ρ).
Now pi ∈ U− along with ρ > pi implies that n−(ρ) − n+(ρ) ≤ n − 2. It follows
that
f3(ρ) =Mk,n−1(ρ) ≠ −1
Since f3(pi) = φ−3(pi) ≤ 0, and f3(ρ) ≠ −1, it follows that f3(pi) ≤ f3(ρ).
Case 2: Assume ρ ∈ U−. Now ρ ∈ U− along with ρ > pi implies that pi = E−.
So n−(pi) − n+(pi) = n. Therefore,
f2(pi) =M−n,n−1(pi) = −1 and f3(pi) =Mk,n−1(pi) = −1
Thus, f2(pi) ≤ f2(ρ) and f3(pi) ≤ f3(ρ).
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Since, n+(pi) − n−(pi) = −n, it follows that
f1(pi) =M−n,l(pi) ≤ 0 ≤ φ−1(ρ) = f1(ρ)
Hence f1(pi) ≤ f1(ρ).
Case 3: Assume neither pi nor ρ are in U−. Then f1(pi) = M−n,l(pi) ≤
M−n,l(ρ) = f1(ρ), f2(pi) =M−n,n−1(pi) ≤M−n,n−1(ρ) = f2(ρ), and f3(pi) =Mk,n−1(pi) ≤
Mk,n−1(ρ) = f3(ρ). Therefore, f is monotone.
Lastly, we can add three similar theorems, in order to state and prove the
converse of Theorem 3.6. These can be proven using Proposition 3.2 and Theorems
3.8, 3.9, and 3.10.
THEOREM 3.11. Let φ+1 ∶ U+ → {−1,0} be any surjective mapping and let k be an
integer such that k ∈ [n,n − 1]. The function g1 ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} defined by
g1(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ+1(pi) pi ∈ U+,
Mk,−n(pi) otherwise,
satisfies cancellation, monotonicity, but not anonymity.
THEOREM 3.12. Let φ+2 ∶ U+ → {−1,0,1} be any surjective mapping. The function
g2 ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} defined by
g2(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ+2(pi) pi ∈ U+,
Mn−1,−n(pi) otherwise,
satisfies cancellation, monotonicity, but not anonymity.
THEOREM 3.13. Let φ+3 ∶ U+ → {0,1} be any surjective mapping, and let l be an
integer such that l ∈ [−n + 1, n]. The function g3 ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} defined by
g3(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ+3(pi) pi ∈ U+,
Mn−1,l(pi) otherwise,
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satisfies cancellation, monotonicity, but not anonymity.
Proof. Since φ+1 , φ+2 , and φ+3 are defined to be non-constant on U+, g1, g2, and g3
are not anonymous. Let pi be a profile such that pi(i) = −1 and pi(j) = 1. Consider
pi′ such that pi′(i) = pi′(j) = 0 and pi′(k) = pi(k) for all k ≠ i, j. Thus neither pi nor pi′
are elements of U+, so g1(pi) =Mk,−n(pi) =Mk,−n(pi′) = g1(pi′), g2(pi) =Mn−1,−n(pi) =
Mn−1,−n(pi′) = g2(pi′), and g3(pi) =Mn−1,l(pi) =Mn−1,l(pi′) = g3(pi′). Thus g1, g2, and
g3 are cancellative.
Now, given g1 and the mapping φ+1 , define
f1 =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−φ+1(−pi) pi ∈ U−
−g1(−pi) otherwise.
Notice that φ−1 ∶ U− → {−1,0,1} defined by φ−1(pi) = −φ+1(−pi) has range {−1,0},
since φ+1 has range {0,1}. If pi /∈ U−, then −pi /∈ U+. So by proposition 3.2, f1(pi) =−g1(−pi) = −Mk,−n(−pi) =M−n,k(pi). Therefore,
f1(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ−1(pi) pi ∈ U−
M−n,k(pi) otherwise.
By Theorem 3.8, f1 is monotone. If pi ≤ ρ, then −pi ≥ −ρ and so f1(−ρ) ≤ f1(−pi).
Therefore, −f1(−ρ) ≥ −f1(−pi). It then follows that g1(ρ) ≥ g1(pi). Hence g1 is
monotone. Similar arguments can be made to show that g2 and g3 are monotone.
Combining Theorems 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and their converses, the following corollary
arises.
COROLLARY 3.3. An aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}n → {−1,0,1} satisfies
cancellation and monotonicity if and only if there exists integers k, l ∈ [−n−1, n] such





φ+(pi) if pi ∈ U+
φ−(pi) if pi ∈ U−
Mk,l(pi) otherwise
(3.17)
where for all pi ∈ U−
Mk,l(E−) ≤ φ−(pi) ≤Mk,l(pi), (3.18)
and for all pi′ ∈ U+
Mk,l(E+) ≥ φ+(pi′) ≥Mk,l(pi′). (3.19)
Proof. First, we will show that f , as defined above is cancellative. Let pi be a
profile such that pi(i) = −1 and pi(j) = 1. Consider pi′ such that pi′(i) = pi′(j) = 0
and pi′(k) = pi(k) for all k ≠ i, j. Thus neither pi nor pi′ are elements of U, thus
f(pi) = Mk,l(pi) = Mk,l(pi′) = f(pi′), since Mk,l is cancellative. Next, we will show
that f is monotone. Let pi ≤ ρ. If pi ∈ U− and ρ ∈ U+, then using equations (3.18)
and (3.19), along with the fact that Mk,l is monotone,
f(pi) = φ−(pi) ≤Mk,l(pi) ≤Mk,l(ρ) ≤ φ+(ρ) = f(ρ).
If pi ∈ U− and ρ /∈ U, then by equation (3.18),
f(pi) = φ−(pi) ≤Mk,l(pi) ≤Mk,l(ρ) = f(ρ).
If pi /∈ U and ρ ∈ U+, then be equation (3.19),
f(pi) =Mk,l(pi) ≤Mk,l(ρ) ≤ φ+(ρ) = f(ρ).
If pi, ρ /∈ U, then f(pi) = Mk,l(pi) ≤ Mk,l(ρ) = f(ρ). Therefore, for any pi ≤ ρ,
f(pi) ≤ f(ρ). Hence f is monotone.
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Now, assume that f satisfies cancellation and monotonicity. Define φ− ∶ U− →{−1,0,1} and φ+ ∶ U+ → {−1,0,1} by the following:
φ−(pi) = f(pi), for all pi ∈ U−, and φ+(pi) = f(pi), for all pi ∈ U+.
Recall, that if f is monotone and cancellative, but not anonymous then by Corollary
3.2, f is either non-constant on U+, U− or both. So, we will examine four cases.
Case 1: Assume f is anonymous. By Corollary 1, f = Mk,l for some
k, l ∈ Z such that k, l ∈ [−n − 1, n] and k + l ≥ −1. Thus f satisfies Equation (3.17).
Since φ− =Mk,l and φ+ =Mk,l it follows that f satisfies Equations (3.18) and (3.19).
Case 2: Assume f is non-constant on both U+ and U−. By Theorem
3.4, f satisfies Equation (3.17) with k = l = n − 1. It was shown in the proof of
Theorem 3.4 that f(pi) ≤ 0 for all pi ∈ U− and f(pi′) ≥ 0 for all pi′ ∈ U+. Since
Mn−1,n−1(pi) =Mn−1,n−1(pi′) = 0 for all pi ∈ U− and pi′ ∈ U+ it follows that Equations
(3.18) and (3.19) hold.
Case 3: Assume f is non-constant on U−. By Theorem 4, there exist
integers k and l belonging to the interval [−n − 1, n] such that k + l ≥ −1 and
f(ρ) = Mk,l(ρ) for any profile ρ not belonging to U−. So Equation (3.17) holds.
Since φ+(pi) = f(pi) =Mk,l(pi) for all pi ∈ U+, Equation (3.19) also holds.
Notice that if k ≤ −n, then φ−(pi) ≤ 1 =Mk,l(pi) for all pi ∈ U− and so Equation
(3.18) holds. If k > −n, then, by Case 2 in the proof of Theorem 4, l = n − 1 and
f(pi′′) ≤ 0 for all pi′′ belonging to U−. Therefore, φ−(pi) = f(pi) ≤ 0 ≤Mk,l(pi) for all
pi ∈ U− and, again, Equation (3.18) also holds.
Case 4: Assume f is non-constant on U+. By Theorem 5, there exist
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integers k and l belonging to the interval [−n − 1, n] such that k + l ≥ −1 and
f(ρ) = Mk,l(ρ) for any profile ρ not belonging to U+. So Equation (3.17) holds.
Since φ−(pi) = f(pi) =Mk,l(pi) for all pi ∈ U−, Equation (3.18) also holds.
We now want to show that Equation (3.19) holds. If f(pi) = −1 for some
pi ∈ U+, then, by definition of l given in the statement of Theorem 5, l ≤ −n. Now
l ≤ −n implies that Mk,l(pi′) = −1 for all pi′ ∈ U+. Thus, φ+(pi′) ≥ −1 = Mk,l(pi′) for
all pi′ ∈ U+ and so Equation (3.19) holds. We may now assume that f(pi′) ≥ 0 for
all pi′ ∈ U+. Since f is monotone, non-constant on U+, and pi′ ≤ E+ for all pi′ ∈ U+
it follows that f(E+) ≠ −1. By Theorem 5, we know that k = n − f(E+) and so
k = n − 1 or k = n. Therefore, Mk,l(pi′) ≤ 0 ≤ φ+(pi′) = f(pi′) for all pi′ ∈ U+ and so in
this case Equation (3.19) holds.
In all cases, we have shown that Equations (3.17), (3.18), and (3.19) hold.
That gives us a complete characterization of the entire class of functions
that are cancellative and monotone. These functions may be called the extended
difference of votes rules. From this point, we will extend these functions in to our
infinite aggregation model. We will look at which axioms these functions satisfy
in the countably infinite model, as well as which axioms are needed to characterize
these functions completely with a countable infinite set of voters.
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CHAPTER 4
DIFFERENCE OF VOTES RULES ON AN INFINITE VOTING MODEL
In this Chapter, we extend the Mk and Mk,l rules to the infinite aggregation
model. As we look at these functions, we will determine which infinite axioms
are needed to completely characterize these classes of rules in the infinite model.
While many of the hypotheses from the previous Chapter hold in this model, it is
important to note that not all do. For this reason, we must be careful to evaluate
and prove each in the infinite model. In fact, the class of Mk rules require an
additional axiom in this model, than was needed in the finite model, and the class
of Mk,l rules have a whole class of exceptions that must be characterized.
The first order of business is to define Mk rules in the domain where the set
of voters is the countably infinite set of natural numbers N. We will us the notation
N0 to indicate the set of natural numbers adjoin 0.
DEFINITION 4.1. An infinite aggregation rule f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is said
to be an Mk rule, if there exists k ∈ N0, such that for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N,
Mk(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k
−1 n−(pi) > n+(pi) + k
0 otherwise.
(4.1)
Now we need to verify what axioms these Mk rules satisfy. The second section
of Chapter 2 can assist the reader in recalling the definitions of each axiom in the
infinite model. Before we clarify which axioms are satisfied, we will state and prove
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a few lemmas regarding axiom interaction, to help with proving axiom satisfaction
later in this Chapter.
This first lemma allows us to only prove one direction of monotonicity, rather
than having to prove both directions, if the function is neutral.
LEMMA 4.1. Suppose the infinite aggregation rule f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} sat-
isfies neutrality. If for any profiles pi, and pi′
pi ≤ pi′ and f(pi) = 1⇒ f(pi′) = 1
then f satisfies Monotonicity.
Proof. Let f satisfy neutrality and assume that for pi ≤ pi′, then f(pi) = 1 implies
that f(pi′) = 1. Consider profiles ρ and ρ′ such that ρ′ ≤ ρ and f(ρ) = −1, then
f(−ρ) = 1 and −ρ ≤ −ρ′, so f(−ρ′) = 1 by hypothesis, and f(ρ′) = −1 by neutrality.
Thus, if there exist profiles pi and ρ such that pi ≥ ρ, if f(ρ) = −1, we are done, if
f(ρ) = 1, we have shown, that f(pi) = 1. If f(ρ) = 0, then f(pi) ≠ −1, since that
would violate ρ′ ≤ ρ and f(ρ) = −1⇒ f(ρ′) = −1. Thus f(pi) = 0 or f(pi) = 1. Hence
f(ρ) ≤ f(pi), and so f is Monotone.
The next lemma allows us to determine the output of an anonymous and
neutral function, if the cardinality of the set of 1’s and −1’s are equal. That is:
LEMMA 4.2. If an infinite aggregation rule f satisfies strong anonymity and neu-
trality, and ∣N+(pi)∣ = ∣N−(pi)∣, then f(pi) = 0.
Proof. Let ∣N+(pi)∣ = ∣N−(pi)∣. Then there exists a bijection φ ∶ N+(pi) → N−(pi).
Define a permutation σ on N via
σ(i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
φ(i) if i ∈ N+(pi)
φ−1(i) if i ∈ N−(pi)
i otherwise.
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Notice that piσ = −pi, by construction of σ. Thus, f(−pi) = f(piσ). By Strong
Anonymity, f(pi) = f(piσ) = f(−pi). By Neutrality, f(−pi) = −f(pi). Hence f(pi) =−f(pi). Therefore, f(pi) = 0.
Next we are able to show that Mk rules satisfy the same axioms in the infinite
model as in the finite model. We can easily notice that finitely anonymous infinite
aggregation rules are a subset of strongly anonymous infinite aggregation rules. We
prove that Mk is strongly anonymous below, as it will be necessary in characterizing
these rules later in this chapter.
THEOREM 4.1. For all nonnegative integers k, Mk ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} satis-
fies strong anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, and cancellation.
Proof. First, note that for any permutation σ of N, n+(pi) = n+(piσ) and n−(pi) =
n−(piσ). Therefore, by the definition of Mk, Mk(pi) = Mk(piσ). Hence, Mk is
strongly anonymous. Also, notice that n+(pi) = n−(−pi) and n−(pi) = n+(−pi). Thus,
Mk(−pi) = −Mk(pi) by the definition of Mk. Thus, Mk is neutral. Let pi ≥ pi′, then
n+(pi) ≥ n+(pi′), and n−(pi) ≤ n−(pi′). Therefore, Mk(pi) ≥Mk(pi′), and Mk is mono-
tone by definition. Let pi = (x1, x2, ...) and pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ...) agree everywhere except
at i, j, and let xi = 1, xj = −1, and x′i = x′j = 0. Then, n+(pi) = n+(pi′) + 1 and
n−(pi) = n−(pi′) + 1. Thus, if n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k, then n+(pi′) > n−(pi′) + k. Similarly,
if n−(pi) > n+(pi) + k, then n−(pi′) > n+(pi′) + k. Hence, Mk is cancellative.
Recall Equation (2.3) that defined M∞ ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1}. It turns out
that this function also satisfies all of the axioms stated in Theorem 4.1.
PROPOSITION 4.1. The infinite aggregation rule M∞ ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1}
satisfies strong anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, and cancellation.
Proof. First, we will show that M∞ is anonymous. Notice that for any permutation
σ of N, n+(pi) = n+(piσ) and n−(pi) = n−(piσ). Therefore, since M∞ is completely
determined by n+(pi) and n−(pi), M∞(pi) =M∞(piσ).
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Next, we will show that M∞ is neutral. Notice that for any pi, N+(pi) =
N−(−pi) and N−(pi) = N+(−pi). So
n+(pi) = n−(−pi) and n−(pi) = n+(−pi). (4.2)
Hence M∞(−pi) = −M∞(pi) for any profile pi.
Now we will show M∞ is monotone. Let pi′ ≥ pi. Now consider pi such
that M∞(pi) = 1. Since n+(pi) = ∞, n+(pi′) = ∞. Also, since n−(pi) < ∞ and
n−(pi′) ≤ n−(pi), therefore n−(pi′) < ∞. Hence M∞(pi′) = 1. Therefore, since M∞ is
neutral, M∞ is monotone by Lemma 4.1.
Finally, we can show that M∞ is cancellative. Let pi = (x1, x2, ...) such that
xi = 1 and xj = −1. Assume M∞(pi) = 1 and consider pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ...) where x′i =
x′j = 0 and x′k = xk for all k ≠ i, j. Then N+(pi′) = N+(pi)/{i}, so n+(pi′) = ∞. Also,
N−(pi′) = N−(pi)/{j}, so n−(pi′) = n−(pi) − 1 <∞. Hence, M∞(pi′) = 1. By neutrality,
the same holds if M∞(pi) = −1. Now, if M∞(pi) = 0, then either n+(pi) < ∞ and
n−(pi) < ∞ or n+(pi) = n−(pi) = ∞. First, assume n+(pi) < ∞ and n−(pi) < ∞.
Consider pi′′ = (x′1, x′2, ...) where x′i = x′j = 0 and x′k = xk, then n+(pi′) = n+(pi)−1 <∞
and n−(pi′) = n−(pi) − 1 <∞. Hence M∞(pi′) = 0. Next, assume n+(pi) = n−(pi) =∞.
Consider pi′′ = (x′1, x′2, ...) where x′i = x′j = 0 and x′k = xk, then n+(pi′) = n+(pi)−1 =∞
and n−(pi′) = n−(pi) − 1 =∞. Hence M∞(pi′) = 0.
A new axiom was defined in Chapter 2 for the infinite aggregation model.
This axiom was called the zero co-finite axiom. Now, we can prove that Mk rules
satisfy the zero co-finite axiom, but the M∞ rule does not.
LEMMA 4.3. For all nonnegative integers k, Mk satisfies the zero co-finite axiom.
Proof. Let pi be a profile such that ∣N+(pi)∣ = k + 1, and ∣N−(pi)∣ = 0. Then N0(pi) is
co-finite and Mk(pi) = 1 ≠ 0. Thus Mk satisfies the zero co-finite axiom.
LEMMA 4.4. The infinite aggregation rule M∞ does not satisfy the zero co-finite
axiom.
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Proof. Let pi be a profile where N0(pi) is co-finite. Thus n+(pi) <∞ and n−(pi) <∞.
Therefore, M∞(pi) ≠ 1 and M∞(pi) ≠ −1, hence M∞(pi) = 0. Therefore, M∞ is not
zero co-finite.
When seeking to characterize the Mk rules in the infinite case, we discovered
the function M∞ also meets all of the criteria for the finite Mk rules, but is not an
Mk rule, unless you allow k =∞. For that reason, it was necessary to introduce the
zero co-finite axiom. It turns out the M∞ function part of entire class of functions
that are not zero co-finite, but satisfy the other axioms. We will look further into
these after we discuss the Mk rules in this model.
Before we characterize the Mk rules in this model, there is an important
lemma regarding infinite aggregation functions that satisfy all of our axioms listed
in Theorem 4.1.
LEMMA 4.5. If an infinite aggregation function f satisfies strong anonymity, can-
cellation, neutrality, and monotonicity, then for any pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N such that N0(pi)
is co-finite and f(pi) = 1, then there exists pi′ ∈ {−1,0,1}N such that n−(pi′) = 0,
f(pi′) = 1 and n+(pi′) = n+(pi) − n−(pi).
Proof. Let pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N such that N0(pi) is co-finite and f(pi) = 1. Let n+(pi) = p
and n−(pi) = q. There exists a permutation σ of N such that piσ = (x1, x2, ....) where
xi = 1 for the first p odd i ∈ N and xi = −1 for the first q even i ∈ N and 0 elsewhere.
Since f is anonymous, f(piσ) = f(pi). If xi = 0 for all i, pi = 0⃗, and since f is neutral,
f(0⃗) = 0. Thus there is at least one non-zero xi. Now, for each pair xi, xi+1 in
piσ, we can use the cancellation property of f to create pii where xi = xi+1 = 0, and
f(pii) = f(piσ) = f(pi) for any i. Furthermore, we can start with pi1 and then repeat
this process, creating pi1,3 = (pi1)3 that has 0′s in the first 4 terms. Continuing in this
manner min{p, q} times to create pi′ has 0′s in the first 2(min{p, q}) terms. Notice,
that since f satisfies (C), f(pi′) = f(pi) = 1. From the construction of pi′, either
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n+(pi′) = 0 or n−(pi′) = 0. Since f(0⃗) = 0 by neutrality, if n+(pi′) = 0, then pi′ < 0⃗;
therefore, by monotonicity, f(pi′) ≤ f(0⃗). But f(pi′) = 1, by (A) and (C). Hence,
n−(pi′) = 0, and n+(pi′) = n+(pi)−min{p, q}. Further, since n−(pi′) = 0, n+(pi) > n−(pi),
and min{p, q} = q = n−(pi). Thus, as desired, n+(pi′) = n+(pi) − n−(pi).
Notice that since f is neutral, if f(pi) = −1, this will still hold for a similar
pi′ with f(pi′) = −1.
Using the same axioms as listed in Theorem 2.1 in the finite characterization,
and the addition of the zero co-finite axiom, we can now fully characterize the Mk
rules in the infinite model with domain {−1,0,1}N.
THEOREM 4.2. An aggregation rule f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} satisfies strong
anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity, cancellation, and zero co-finite if and only if
f is an Mk-rule for some k ∈ N0.
Proof. If f is an Mk rule, we showed above that it has these properties. Now, assume
that f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} satisfies strong anonymity, neutrality, monotonicity,
cancellation, and zero co-finite. Since f satisfies the zero co-finite axiom, there
is a profile such ρ such that N0(ρ) is co-finite and f(ρ) ≠ 0. Since f is neutral,
f(−ρ) = −f(ρ); therefore, {f(ρ),−f(ρ)} = {1,−1}. Thus, without loss of generality,
we can assume that there exists a profile ρ such that f(ρ) = 1. Then by Lemma
4.5, there exists ρ′ such that f(ρ′) = 1, n−(ρ′) = 0, and n+(ρ′) = n+(ρ) − n−(ρ). We
can then define
k = min{n+(pi) ∶ n−(pi) = 0 and f(pi) = 1} − 1. (4.3)
We know that this minimum exists, since n+(ρ′) is in the set {n+(pi) ∶ n−(pi) =
0 and f(pi) = 1}. We can insure that min{n+(pi) ∶ n−(pi) = 0 and f(pi) = 1} ≥ 1 since
if n+(pi) = 0, then by Lemma 4.2, f(pi) = 0. Let α be a profile that obtains this
minimum and has all 1’s appearing first, followed by all zeros.
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Let Mk be defined as earlier, based on k above, and assume Mk(pi) = 1.
Then n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k. To determine f(pi), since Mk satisfies strong anonymity,
neutrality, monotonicity, cancellation, and zero co-finite, if n+(pi) + n−(pi) < ∞, by
Lemma 4.5 we can create pi′ such that Mk(pi′) = 1, n−(pi′), and n+(pi′) = n+(pi) −
n−(pi). Then, by definition of k, and since both pi′ and α have all 1’s moved to
the front of the profile, α ≤ pi′. Then by monotonicity, f(pi′) ≥ f(α) = 1. Since
f is also strong anonimity and cancellation, we can then infer that f(pi) = 1 in
a similar manner as in the proof of Lemma 4.5. If N0(pi) is not co-finite, since
Mk(pi) = 1, we cannot have n+(pi) = n−(pi) =∞, because then Mk(pi) = 0, by Lemma
4.2. Therefore, either n+(pi) < ∞ or n−(pi) < ∞. Since one of these sets is finite,
we can follow in the same manner of cancellation as in Lemma 4.5 and create a pi′
such that n−(pi′) = 0 or n+(pi′) = 0, and Mk(pi′) = Mk(pi). Since Mk is anonymous
and neutral, by Lemma 4.2, f(0⃗) = 0. Since pi′ ≥ 0⃗ and Mk is monotone,Mk(pi′) ≥ 0
so Mk(pi′) ≠ −1 implying Mk(pi′) = 1. Hence, n−(pi′) = 0. Furthermore, since f is
also monotone, and n−(pi′) = 0, then pi′ > ρ′ implies f(pi′) ≥ f(ρ′) = 1. Therefore
f(pi′) = 1 and by cancellation and a similar argument as in Lemma 4.5, f(pi) = 1.
By neutrality, we then can say that if Mk(pi) = −1, then f(pi) = −1. If
Mk(pi) = 0, then n+(pi) ≤ n−(pi) + k and n−(pi) ≤ n+(pi) + k, or both are infinite. If
both are not infinite, then, by minimality of k + 1, f(pi) = 0. If both are infinite, by
Lemma 4.2 f(pi) =Mk(pi) = 0.
Now, let f(pi) = 1, then if we assume Mk(pi) = 0. This would imply from
above that f(pi) = 0, so Mk(pi) ≠ 0. Similarly, Mk(pi) ≠ −1. Thus, Mk(pi) = 1. The
same argument will show that f(pi) = 0 → Mk(pi) = 0 and f(pi) = −1 → Mk(pi) =−1.
Since the characterization from Llamazares did not include the zero co-finite
axiom, we wished to remove this axiom. In this infinite model, there are many
different functions that satisfy neutrality, strong anonymity, monotonicity, and can-
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cellation, but are not zero co-finite. We mentioned the infinite aggregation rule M∞
earlier,we no introduce two new classes of functions: the fk class of functions and
the I function.
DEFINITION 4.2. For any integer k ≥ −1, define the infinite aggregation function




1 if 2n−(pi) + n0(pi) ≤ k;
−1 if 2n+(pi) + n0(pi) ≤ k;
0 otherwise.
(4.4)
Notice that if k = −1, then fk(pi) ≠ 1 for any pi and fk(pi) ≠ −1 for any pi.
Therefore, f−1 is the constant 0 function.
PROPOSITION 4.2. For any integer k ≥ −1, the infinite aggregation function fk
defined above satisfies neutrality, strong anonymity, monotonicity, and cancellation,
but is not zero co-finite.
Proof. First, notice that if 2n−(pi) + n0(pi) ≤ k, then n+(pi) = ∞, and if 2n+(pi) +
n0(pi) ≤ k, then n−(pi) = ∞. It follows then that if N0(pi) is co-finite, then both
N+(pi) and N−(pi) are finite, and when both N−(pi) and N+(pi) are finite fk(pi) = 0
for all k. Thus the class of fk rules are not zero co-finite.
Next, assume that fk(pi) = 1, then 2n−(pi)+n0(pi) ≤ k. Consider now −pi and
observe that n+(−pi) = n−(pi) and n0(pi) = n0(−pi). It follows then that 2n+(−pi) +
n0(−pi) ≤ k, so fk(−pi) = −1. Similarly, if fk(pi) = −1, then fk(−pi) = 1. Hence fk
rules satisfy neutrality.
Let pi be any profile in {−1,0,1}N and σ a permutation of N. Then consider
the profile piσ. It can be seen clearly that n−(piσ) = n−(pi), n+(piσ) = n+(pi), and
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n0(piσ) = n0(pi). Therefore, if 2n−(pi) + n0(pi) ≤ k, then 2n−(piσ) + n0(piσ) ≤ k and if
2n+(pi) + n0(pi) ≤ k, then 2n+(piσ) + n0(piσ) ≤ k. Thus fk(piσ) = fk(pi).
Now consider profiles pi,pi′ such that pi ≤ pi′. Assume that fk(pi) = 1, then
2n−(pi) + n0(pi) ≤ k. This means the set of voters who didn’t vote for alternative 1
is at most k. Since pi′ ≥ pi, N+(pi) ⊆ N+(pi′), n−(pi′) ≤ n−(pi), and n−(pi′) + n0(pi′) ≤
n−(pi)+n0(pi). Thus 2n−(pi′)+n0(pi′) ≤ 2n−(pi)+n0(pi) ≤ k. Thus fk(pi′) = 1 and by
Lemma 4.1, fk is Monotone.
Lastly, let the profiles pi = (x1, x2, ...) and pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ...) be such that xk = x′k
for all k ≠ i, j, xi = 1, xj = −1, and x′i = x′j = 0. If fk(pi) = 1, 2n−(pi) + n0(pi) ≤
k, then 2n−(pi′) + n0(pi′) = 2[n−(pi) − 1] + n0(pi) + 2 = 2n−(pi) + n0(pi) ≤ k. Thus
fk(pi′) = fk(pi) = 1. If instead, 2n+(pi)+n0(pi) ≤ k, then similarly, 2n+(pi′)+n0(pi′) =
2[n+(pi) − 1] + n0(pi) + 2 = 2n+(pi) + n0(pi) ≤ k. Hence fk(pi′) = fk(pi) = −1. Thus it
follows that fk is cancellative.
DEFINITION 4.3. Now, define the infinite aggregation function




1 if N+(pi) is co-finite;
−1 if N−(pi) if co-finite;
0 otherwise.
(4.5)
PROPOSITION 4.3. The infinite aggregation function I defined above satisfies
neutrality, strong anonymity, monotonicity, and cancellation, but is not zero co-
finite.
Proof. First, notice that if N+(pi) is co-finite, then n+(pi) = ∞, and if N−(pi) is
co-finite, then n−(pi) = ∞. If N0(pi) is co-finite, then both N+(pi) and N−(pi) are
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finite. When both N−(pi) and N+(pi) are finite, then I(pi) = 0. It follows then that
function I is not zero co-finite.
Next, assume that I(pi) = 1, then N+(pi) is co-finite. Consider now −pi and
observe that N−(−pi) = N+(pi). It follows that N−(−pi) is co-finite, so I(−pi) = −1.
Similarly, if I(pi) = −1, then I(−pi) = 1. Hence I satisfies neutrality.
Let pi be any profile in {−1,0,1}N and σ a permutation of N. Then consider
the profile piσ. It can be seen clearly that n−(piσ) = n−(pi), n+(piσ) = n+(pi), and
n0(piσ) = n0(pi). Therefore, if N+(pi) is co-finite, then N+(piσ) is as well and if
N−(pi) is co-finite, then N−(piσ) is also co-finite. Thus I(piσ) = I(pi).
Now consider profiles pi,pi′ such that pi ≤ pi′. Assume that I(pi) = 1, then
N+(pi) is co-finite. This means the set of voters who didn’t vote for alternative 1 is
finite. Since pi′ ≥ pi, N+(pi) ⊆ N+(pi′), so N+(pi′) is also co-finite. Thus I(pi′) = 1 and
by Lemma 4.1, I is Monotone.
Lastly, let the profiles pi = (x1, x2, ...) and pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ...) be such that xk =
x′k for all k ≠ i, j, xi = 1, xj = −1, and x′i = x′j = 0. If I(pi) = 1, N+(pi) is co-
finite, then N+(pi′) = N+(pi)/i and N−(pi′) ∪ N0(pi′) = N−(pi)/j ∪ N0(pi) ∪ {i, j}.
Thus N+(pi′) infinite, and N−(pi′) ∪N0(pi′) is finite, so N+(pi′) is co-finite. Hence,I(pi′) = I(pi) = 1. If instead, N−(pi) is co-finite, then similarly, N−(pi′) = N−(pi′)/i
and N+(pi′) ∪N0(pi′) = N−(pi)/j ∪N0(pi) ∪ {i, j}. Hence I(pi′) = I(pi) = −1. Thus it
follows that I is cancellative.
THEOREM 4.3. An infinite aggregation function f satisfies strong anonymity,
monotonicity, neutrality, and cancellation, and is not zero co-finite if and only if
f = fk for some integer k ≥ −1 or f = I or f =M∞.
Proof. We have shown that fk, I and M∞ satisfy all of our axioms in Propositions
4.2, 4.3, and 4.1, respectively. Therefore, we only need to prove that if the axioms
are satisfied, then we have one of these three classes of rules.
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Now, assume that f satisfies the axioms listed. Consider the set
O = {n0(pi) ∶ pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N and f(pi) = 1}
If O = ∅, then f = f−1, and we are done. Now we may assume that O is non-empty
and we have two cases.
Case 1. Assume that the set O is bounded above by some integer k, such
that maxO = k. We will show that f(pi) = fk(pi) for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N.
Let pi be any profile such that n−(pi) > 0 and 2n(pi) + n0(pi) is finite. Let A
be a subset of N+(pi) such that ∣A∣ = n−(pi). Let pi′ be the profile satisfying
N−(pi) = ∅ and N0(pi′) = N0(pi) ∪N−(pi) ∪A
Notice that n−(pi′) = 0 and n0(pi′) = 2n(pi) + n0(pi). Moreover, since both f
and fk satisfy cancellation
f(pi′) = f(pi) and fk(pi′) = fk(pi).
Assume that f(pi) = 1. If n−(pi) = 0, then 2n−(pi) + n0(pi) = n0(pi) ≤ k
and so fk(pi) = 1. If n−(pi) > 0, then we can work with the profile pi′. Now
f(pi) = 1 implies that f(pi′) = 1. Since f(pi′) = 1 it follows that n0(pi′) ≤ k. Since
n0(pi′) = 2n−(pi) + n0(pi) we get that 2n−(pi) + n0(pi) ≤ k and so fk(pi′) = 1. Hence
fk(pi) = 1.
Now suppose that fk(α) = 1 for some profile α. Then 2n−(α) + n0(α) ≤ k.
Let ρ be a profile where the maximum value of the set O is achieved. So f(ρ) = 1
and n0(ρ) = k. By the previous paragraph, f(ρ) = 1 implies fk(ρ) = 1 and so
2n−(ρ)+n0(ρ) ≤ k = n0(ρ). It follows that n−(ρ) = 0. By the argument given above,
we know that there exists a profile α′ such that n−(α′) = 0, n0(α′) = 2n−(α)+n0(α),
f(α′) = f(α), and fk(α′) = fk(α). Since
n−(α′) = n−(ρ) = 0 and n0(α′) ≤ n0(ρ),
52
it follows that there exists a permutation σ of N such that ρσ ≤ α′. Applying strong
anonymity and monotonicity we get
f(ρ) = f(ρσ) ≤ f(α′).
Now f(ρ) = 1 implies that f(α′) = 1. Hence f(α) − 1.
We can say that, for any profile pi, f(pi) = 1 if and only if fk(pi) = 1. Since f
and fk are neutral, f(pi) = fk(pi) for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N.
Case 2. Assume that the set O is not bounded above. Then we have two
sub-cases: either A. for any profile pi, f(pi) = 1 implies that n0(pi) <∞ or B. there
exists a profile α such that f(α) = 1 and n0(α) =∞.
If A. holds, then we will show that f(pi) = I(pi) for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N.
First, assume that f(pi) = 1. Then n0(pi) is finite. Since f is not zero co-finite,
n−(pi) + n+(pi) =∞. Since f is anonymous neutral, if n+(pi) = n−(pi), then f(pi) = 0.
Since f is monotone, n+(pi) > n−(pi). Therefore, n+(pi) =∞. Thus n−(pi) <∞, and
it follows that N+(pi) is co-finite. Hence I(pi) = 1. Since f and I are neutral, if
f(pi) = −1, then I(pi) = −1.
Next, we want to show that if I(pi) = 1, then f(pi) = 1. But first, we must
observe the following result.
Let l be any nonnegative integer and ρ be any profile such that n−(ρ) = l
and n0(ρ) = 0. Since O is unbounded from above there exists a profile ρ′ such that
2l ≤ n0(ρ′) <∞ and f(ρ′) = 1. Now choose a profile ρ′′ such that N+(ρ′′) = N+(ρ′)∪A
and N−(ρ′′) = N−(ρ′) ∪B, where A and B are disjoint subsets of N0(ρ′) such that∣A∣ = ∣B∣ = l. By cancellation, f(ρ′′) = f(ρ′) = 1. Notice n−(ρ′′) ≥ l. We can find
a permutation σ of N such that ρ′′σ ≤ ρ. By strong anonymity and monotonicity,
f(ρ′′) = f(ρ′′σ) ≤ f(ρ) = 1.
Now assume I(pi) = 1. Then N+(pi) is co-finite. Then there exists a non-
negative integer l such that l = ∣N0(pi)∪N−(pi)∣. Let ρ be the profile where N−(ρ) =
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N0(pi)∪N−(pi) and N+(ρ) = N+(pi).It follows from above that f(ρ) = 1. Since ρ ≤ pi,
it follows from monotonicity that f(pi) = 1. Since both I and f are neutral, we have
that f(pi) = I(pi) for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N.
If B. holds, then we will show that f(pi) =M∞(pi) for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N.
Assume first that f(pi) = 1. Since f is not zero co-finite, either n+(pi) = ∞
or n−(pi) = ∞. If n+(pi) = n−(pi) = ∞, then, by Lemma 4.2, f(pi) = 0 contrary to
f(pi) = 1. If n−(pi) = ∞ and n+(pi) < ∞, then we can remove n+(pi) 1’s and n+(pi)−1’s from the profile pi and create a profile pi′ such that n+(pi′) = 0 and f(pi′) = f(pi).
So f(pi′) = −1. Observe that pi′ ≤ 0⃗, so by monotonicity, f(pi′) ≤ f(0⃗), and f(0⃗) = 0
by Lemma 4.2. However, this contradicts that f(pi′) = 1. Therefore, n+(pi) =∞ and
n−(pi) <∞. Thus M∞(pi) = 1.
If f(pi) = −1, then by neutrality f(−pi) = 1. From above, f(−pi) = 1 implies
M∞(−pi) = 1. Since M∞ is neutral, M∞(pi) = −1.
Assume now that M∞(pi) = 1. Consider α, the profile described previously.
Notice that if n−(pi) = n+(pi), then by Lemma 4.2, f(pi) = 0. Since f(α) = 1,
n(α) ≠ n+(α). Since f is not zero co-finite, either n+(α) = ∞ or n−(α) = ∞. It
follows by monotonicity that n+(α) = ∞ and n−(α) < ∞. Since n=(α) = ∞, and
f satisfies cancellation, there exists a profile α′ such that n−(α′) = 0, n+(α′) = ∞,
and f(α′) = f(α) = 1. Thus N0(α′) ∪ N+(α′) = N. Since M∞(pi) = 1, we know
that n−(pi) < ∞. By cancellation of M∞, there exists pi′ such that n−(pi′) = 0,
n+(pi′) = n+(pi) =∞, and M∞(pi′) =M∞(pi). Now we have that N0(pi′)∪N+(pi′) = N
and either n0(pi′) <∞ or n0(pi′) =∞. If n0(pi′) =∞, then there exists a permutation
σ of N such that pi′σ > α′, then f(pi′σ) = f(pi′) = f(pi), by strong anonymity and
cancellation. Also, f(pi′σ) ≥ f(α′) = f(α) = 1. Thus f(pi) = f(pi′) = f(pi′σ) = 1,
If instead, both n0(pi′) = n+(pi′) =∞, then there exists two bijections σ1 and
σ2 defined as follows:
σ1 ∶ N0(pi′)→ N0(α′)
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and
σ2 ∶ N+(pi′)→ N+(α′)
.
Now, define the permutation σ of N as follows:
σ(i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
σ1(i) if i ∈ N0(pi′)
σ2(i) if i ∈ N+(pi′).
Observe that pi′ = α′σ. By strong anonymity, f(pi′) = f(α′σ) = f(α′) = 1. We
now know that for any profile pi, M∞(pi) = 1 if and only if f(pi) = 1. Therefore by
neutrality, f =M∞ and we are done.
From the preceding results, we can now characterize all infinite aggregation
functions that satisfy strong anonymity, monotonicity, neutrality, and cancellation.
The following corollary comes as a result of Theorems 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, as well as
Propositions 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3,
COROLLARY 4.1. If f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} satisfies strong anonymity, mono-
tonicity, neutrality, and cancellation than one of the following holds:
1. There exists an integer k ≥ 0 such that f =Mk;
2. There exists an integer k ≥ −1 such that f = fk;
3. The function f = I;
4. The function f =M∞.
Now that we have completely extended the characterization of Mk rules to
the infinite model, we will look at what happens when we reduce the axioms used
in this characterization. In order to do so, let us look at the relationship between
cancellation and anonymity in the infinite model. First, by introducing subsets of
the domain, as we did in the finite model.
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DEFINITION 4.4. Define the following subsets of {−1,0,1}N:
U+ = {pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N ∶ n0(pi) = 1, n−(pi) = 0}
U− = {pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N ∶ n0(pi) = 1, n+(pi) = 0}
and U = U+ ∪ U−
While cancellation does not imply strong anonymity of this model, we can
show that it implies finite anonymity on a large subset of the domain. We give an
example below of a function that is not finite anonymous, to clarify that cancellation
does not imply finite anonymity
EXAMPLE 4.1. There exists integers k ≥ 0, l ≥ 1 and an infinite aggregation
function F ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} where F is defined as follows:
F (pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
Mk(pi) if pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N/U
1 if pi ∈ U and xi = 0 for i ≤ l
−1 if pi ∈ U and xi = 0 for i > l
(4.6)
Notice, if a profile pi is in U , there is only one 0 in a profile, then the placement of
that 0 uniquely determines the output, thus F is not finite anonymous. If pi /∈ U ,
F = Mk, so F is cancellative. However, if pi ∈ U there exists no such integers i, j
such that xi = −1, and xj = 1 or r, s such that xr = xs = 0, thus cancellation is
trivially satisfied.
Now, we can show that the cancellation implies finite anonymity, when the
domain is restricted to {−1,0,1}N/U . Recall that Σ is the set of all finite permuta-
tions of N.
THEOREM 4.4. If an infinite aggregation rule f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is can-
cellative, then for all profiles pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N/U and all permutations σ ∈ Σ, f(pi) =
f(piσ).
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Proof. Since any finite permutation can be written as a product of transpositions,
we may assume that σ = (i j), for some i, j ∈ N. We will show that for any profile
pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N/U that f(pi) = f(piσ). We have three cases.
Case 1 If xi = xj, then piσ = pi, and it follows that f(pi) = f(piσ).
Case 2 If xi = 1 and xj = −1. Then, since f is cancellative, we can create
profiles pi′ and pi′′, successively, as shown in Table 1, with k ≠ i and k ≠ j.




pi 1 −1 xk
pi′ 0 0 xk
pi′′ −1 1 xk
Then, we can see easily that pi′′ = piσ, and since, by cancellation f(pi) = f(pi′) =
f(pi′′), then f(pi) = f(piσ).
Case 3 If xi = 0 and xj = 1, we will assume this is the same as if xi = 0 and
xj = −1, as the proof is almost identical. Since pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N/U , either there exists
a profile element xr such that xr = 0 and r ≠ i or there exists a profile element xs
such that xs = −1. If there exists an xr = 0, then we will successively create profiles
pi′ and pi′′, using cancellation, as in Table 2.
Table 4.2: Case 3i
term
profile
i j r k
pi 0 1 0 xk
pi′ 1 1 −1 xk
pi′′ 1 0 0 xk
If there exists xs = −1, then we will successively create profiles pi′ and pi′′ as in Table
3. In either case, we can see that pi′′ = piσ and by cancellation f(pi) = f(pi′) = f(pi′′).
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Table 4.3: Case 3ii
term
profile
i j s k
pi 0 1 −1 xk
pi′ 0 0 0 xk
pi′′ 1 0 −1 xk
Thus f(pi) = f(piσ) as desired.
Next we will prove the necessity of our axioms listed in Theorem 4.2. In
order to do this, we will give examples of functions that satisfy some, but not all,
of the axioms.
The first example will be proven to be anonymous, neutral, cancellative, and
zero co-finite, but not monotone.
EXAMPLE 4.2. The aggregation function N will be defined as follows.
N(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
M∞(pi) N0 is not co-finite.
−M0(pi) N0 is co-finite. (4.7)
THEOREM 4.5. The function N ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is strongly anonymous,
neutral, cancellative, and zero co-finite, but is not monotone.
Proof. First, we will show that N is strongly anonymous. For any permutation σ of
N and pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N, if N0(pi) is co-finite, then N0(piσ) is co-finite. Also n+(piσ) =
n+(pi) and n−(piσ) = n−(pi). Since both M∞(pi) and M0(pi) depend completely on
N0(pi), n−(pi) and n+(pi), N(pi) = N(piσ).
Next we will show that N is neutral. Let N(pi) = 1, then either (1) n−(pi) =∞
and n+(pi) < ∞ or (2) N0(pi) is co-finite and n+(pi) > n−(pi). We will assume first
that that (1) holds. Since N−(pi) = N+(−pi) and N+(pi) = N−(−pi) so n+(−pi) = ∞
and n−(−pi) <∞. Therefore f(−pi) = −1. Now assume that (2) holds, then N0(pi) is
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co-finite; thus, N0(−pi) is co-finite. Again, N−(pi) = N+(−pi) and N+(pi) = N−(−pi),
so n+(−pi) < n−(pi) and N(−pi) = −1. Hence N is neutral.
Now we will show that N is cancellative. Notice first, if N0(pi) is co-finite
(not co-finite), and xi, xj ∈ pi such that xi = 1 and xj = −1, we can create pi′ with
x′k = xk for all k ≠ i, j, x′i = x′j = 0, and N0(pi′) is also co-finite (not co-finite). Then
for any profile pi there again are two cases:
Case 1 N0(pi) is co-finite. Then consider pi such that f(pi) = 1 with xi = 1 and xj = −1
and pi′ with x′k = xk for all k ≠ i, j, x′i = x′j = 0. Since N(pi) = 1, n+(pi) = ∞
and it follows that n+(pi′) =∞. Also, n−(pi′) = n−(pi) − 1 <∞, thus N(pi′) = 1.
Since N is neutral, this will hold with N(pi) = −1.
Case 2 N0(pi) is not co-finite. Then let N(pi) = 1, thus n+(pi) ≤ n−(pi). Then for any
pair xi, xj ∈ pi such that xi = 1 and xj = −1, if we create pi′ such that x′i = x′j = 0
and x′k = xk for all k ≠ i, j. Then n+(pi′) = n+(pi) − 1 and n−(pi′) = n−(pi) − 1.
Thus n+(pi′) < n−(pi′), so N(pi′) = 1. Again, neutrality holds, so the N(pi) = −1
case follows.
We can show that N satisfies the zero co-finite axiom quickly by noting that
if pi is such that n+(pi) = 1 and n−(pi) = 0, then N(pi) = 1. N0(pi) is obviously
co-finite, and N(pi) ≠ 0.
Lastly, we will show the N is not monotone. Let pi be such that N0 is co-finite
and N(pi) = 1. Thus, n+(pi) < n−(pi). We know N(−pi) = −1 and n−(−pi) < n+(−pi)
by neutrality. Also, N+(pi) = N−(−pi) and N−(pi) = N+(−pi); hence, −pi ≥ pi. Under
the monotonicity condition, this would imply N(−pi) ≥ N(pi), but this is not the
case. Thus, N is not monotone.
Next we will define an aggregation function that is finitely anonymous, mono-
tone, cancellative, neutral and zero co-finite, but is not strongly anonymous.
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EXAMPLE 4.3. Let E = {z ∈ N0 ∶ z2 ∈ N0} be the set of positive even integers, and
define F ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} via
F (pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 n+(pi) = n−(pi) =∞ and ∣E/N+(pi)∣ <∞
−1 n+(pi) = n−(pi) =∞ and ∣E/N−(pi)∣ <∞
M0(pi) otherwise.
(4.8)
We will prove that the aggregation function F satisfies all of the axioms of Theorem
4.2 except strong anonymity.
THEOREM 4.6. The function F ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is zero co-finite, neutral,
cancellative, monotone, and finite anonymous (but not strongly anonymous) .
Proof. First, note the M0 is zero co-finite, so F is as well. Before continuing this
proof, it is important to notice that since M0 is both strongly anonymous and
neutral, if n+(pi) = n−(pi), M0(pi) = 0. Therefore, if F (pi) ≠ 0 we must be in the case
where F ≠M0, so n+(pi) = n−(pi) =∞ and either ∣E/N+(pi)∣ <∞ or ∣E/N−(pi)∣ <∞.
Alternatively, if n+(pi) = n−(pi) and F (pi) = 0, then neither ∣E/N+(pi)∣ < ∞ nor∣E/N−(pi)∣ <∞ hold, so F (pi) =M0(pi) = 0.
Next we will show neutrality. If we are in the case where pi is such that F (pi) =
M0(pi), we are done, since M0 is neutral. Observe that E/N+(pi) = E/N−(−pi) and
E/N+(−pi) = E/N−(pi). Therefore, if F (pi) ≠ M0(pi), then F (pi) = −F (pi). Thus F
is neutral.
Cancellation holds for M0 as well, so if pi is such that F (pi) =M0(pi), cancel-
lation holds. If F (pi) ∈ {−1,1} and n+(pi) = n−(pi) =∞, then either ∣E/N+(pi)∣ <∞
or ∣E/N−(pi)∣ <∞. Without loss of generality, assume F (pi) = 1 then ∣E/N+(pi)∣ <∞.
Let pi = (x1, x2, ....), such that xi = 1 and xj = −1. Consider pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ...) such
that x′k = xk for all k ≠ i, j and xi = xj = 0. Then n+(pi′) = n−(pi′) = ∞ and
N+(pi) ⊆ N+(pi′). Thus ∣E/N+(pi′)∣ < ∣E/N+(pi)∣ < ∞, so F (pi′) = F (pi) = 1. Since
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cancellation is a finite process, no amount would make n+(pi) = n−(pi) <∞, thus F
is cancellative.
For profiles pi and pi′ such that pi ≤ pi′, if F (pi) =M0(pi) and F (pi′) =M0(pi′),
then F (pi) ≤ F (pi′) since M0 is monotone. Now, let pi ≤ pi′ such that F (pi) = 1 and
n+(pi) = n−(pi) =∞, then either n+(pi′) = n−(pi′) =∞ or n+(pi′) =∞ and n−(pi′) <∞,
since monotonicity is point-wise. If we are in the latter case, then F (pi′) =M0(pi′)
and n+(pi′) > n−(pi′), so F (pi) = 1. If we are in the former case, then we know that∣E/N+(pi)∣ < ∞. Since N+(pi) ⊆ N+(pi′), so ∣E/N+(pi′)∣ ≤ ∣E/N+(pi)∣ < ∞. Hence
F (pi) = 1. Thus, by Lemma 4.1, F is monotone.
Since F is cancellative, by Theorem 4.4, for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N/U and τ ∈ Σ,
F (pi) = F (piτ). Let ρ ∈ U , then either (i) n+(ρ) =∞ and n−(ρ) = 0 or (ii) n−(ρ) =∞
and n+(ρ) = 0. In either case, for any permutation σ ∈ Σ, we find ρσ ∈ U as well. So
F (ρ) =M0(ρ) and F (ρσ) =M0(ρσ). Furthermore, since M0 is strongly anonymous,
F (ρ) =M0(ρ) =M0(ρσ) = F (ρσ) for ρ ∈ U . Hence F is finite anonymous.
However, consider the following permutation φ of N and profile α = (a1, a2, ...)
φ(i) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
i + 1 if i ∈ N/E
i − 1 if i ∈ E
ai =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 if i ∈ E
−1 if i ∈ N/E
Then n+(α) = n−(α) =∞ and ∣E/N+(α)∣ = 0 <∞, so F (α) = 1. If we apply φ to α,
then n+(αφ) = n−(αφ) = ∞, but ∣E/N−(α)∣ = 0 < ∞, so F (αφ) = −1. Thus F is not
strongly anonymous.
The next example is strongly anonymous, neutral, monotone, and zero co-
finite, but is not cancellative.
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EXAMPLE 4.4. Consider now the aggregation function H ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1},
H(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
M0(pi) n+(pi) ≥ 4 or n−(pi) ≥ 4
0 otherwise.
(4.9)
THEOREM 4.7. The aggregation function H ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is strongly
anonymous, neutral, monotone, and zero co-finite, but is not cancellative.
Proof. First, we will show that H is not cancellative and zero co-finite. Consider the
profiles pi = (x1, x2, ...) and pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ...) such that n+(pi) = 4, n−(pi) = 1, xk = x′k
for all k ≠ i, j and xi = 1, xj = −1 with x′i = x′j = 0. Then H(pi) = 1, showing H is
zero co-finite. Also, since n+(pi) = 4 and n−(pi) < 4, but H(pi′) = 0, since n+(pi′) = 3
and n−(pi) = 0. Therefore, since H(pi) ≠H(pi′), H is not cancellative.
For n+(pi) ≥ 4 or n−(pi) ≥ 4, H is strongly anonymous and neutral, since
H(pi) = M0(pi). Otherwise, the function H is the trivial function, and is trivially
strongly anonymous, neutral, and monotone. Therefore, H is strongly anonymous,
and neutral. Now, we need to show that H is monotone. We need only to consider
what happens when comparing two profiles where one meets the criteria for M0 and
one meets the criteria for the trivial part of H.
Let ρ and ρ′ be profiles such that n+(ρ) ≤ 3, n−(ρ) ≤ 3 and ρ′ ≥ ρ. Thus
H(ρ) = 0. Since ρ′ ≥ ρ, n+(ρ′) ≥ n+(ρ) and n−(ρ′) ≤ n−(ρ) ≤ 3. If n+(ρ′) ≥ 4, then
H(ρ′) = 1. If n+(ρ′) ≤ 3, then H(ρ′) = 0. Hence H(ρ′) ≥ H(ρ). Since H is neutral,
it follows that H is monotone.
Our final example is the extension of the Mk,l rule defined in the finite model
in Equation 3.1. This rule will satisfy all of our axioms, except neutrality.
For this example, we need to introduce some new notation. For our purposes,
the notation −∞ represents the opposite of ∞, and so ∞−∞ = 0.
EXAMPLE 4.5. Consider now the function Mk,l ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} for k, l ∈
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Z ∪ {−∞,∞} such that k ≠ l and k + l ≥ −1.
Mk,l(pi) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k
−1 n−(pi) > n+(pi) + l
0 otherwise.
(4.10)
Before proving that the Mk,l rules satisfy our axioms, we extend Lemmas 3.1
and 3.2 to this model.
LEMMA 4.6. If k, l ∈ Z∪{−∞,∞} then Mk,l is well defined if and only if k+ l ≥ −1.
Proof. First, if both k and l are less than 0, it follows that both n+(ρ) > n−(ρ) + k
and n−(ρ) > n+(ρ)+l would hold for the profile ρ = (0,0,0, ...); therefore, both k and
l cannot be negative. In order for Mk,l to be well defined, we must restrict the values
of k and l further. Assume that there exists pi such that both n+(pi) > n−(pi)+k and
n−(pi) > n+(pi) + l hold. Then, n+(pi) ≥ n−(pi) + k + 1 and n−(pi) ≥ n+(pi) + l + 1. By
substitution, n+(pi) ≥ n+(pi)+k+l+2, and k+l ≤ −2. Hence, from the contrapositive,
we have that if k + l ≥ −1, then Mk,l is well-defined.
LEMMA 4.7. The function Mk,l is neutral if and only if k = l.
Proof. If k = l, then since k + l > −2, 2k > −1, and k ≥ 0. Therefore, by definition,
we have an Mk rule which is neutral by Theorem 4.1. Now, assume that Mk,l is
neutral, then Mk,l(0,0,0, ...) = 0 by Lemma 4.2, so k ≥ 0 and l ≥ 0.
First, let k <∞, the consider pi such that n+(pi) = k + 1 and n−(pi) = 0, then
Mk,l(pi) = 1. By neutrality, Mk,l(−pi) = −1, when n−(−pi) = k + 1 and n+(−pi) = 0.
Therefore, k + 1 > n+(−pi) + l = l. Thus k ≥ l. Similarly, consider ρ such that
n−(ρ) = l + 1 and n+(ρ) = 0, then Mk,l(ρ) = −1. Considering −ρ, n+(−ρ) = l + 1 and
n−(−ρ) = 0, and by neutrality Mk,l(−ρ) = 1. Therefore, l + 1 > n−(−ρ) + k = k, so
l ≥ k. Thus, it follows that k = l.
63
Next, let k = ∞, then in order for Mk,l(pi) = 1, n+(pi) > n−(pi) + ∞, which
cannot occur. Therefore, there exists no pi such thatMk,l(pi) = 1. Then by neutrality,
there is no pi such that Mk,l(pi) = −1. Hence Mk,l(pi) = 0 for all pi, thus k = l =∞.
We can now prove that the class of Mk,l rules is strongly anonymous, can-
cellative, zero co-finite, monotone, but is not neutral.
THEOREM 4.8. For any k, l ∈ Z ∪ {−∞,∞} such that k ≠ l and k + l ≥ −1 the
function Mk,l ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} is strongly anonymous, cancellative, zero
co-finite, monotone, but is not neutral.
Proof. Next, notice that Mk,l is zero co-finite, for finite k and l since the profile with
n+(pi) − n−(pi) = k + 1 yields Mk,l(pi) = 1, but ∣N0(pi)∣ =∞ and ∣N+(pi) ∪N−(pi)∣ <∞.
Since k ≠ l and k + l ≥ −1, if k = ∞, then l = −∞, and visa versa. In either case,
Mk,l(pi) ≠ 0 for all pi and thus Mk,l is zero co-finite.
Now, notice that for any permutation σ of N and pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N, n+(pi) =
n+(piσ) and n−(pi) = n−(piσ). Therefore, for Mk,l(pi) = Mk,l(piσ). Hence, Mk,l is
strongly anonymous.
Let pi = (x1, x2, ...) and pi′ = (x′1, x′2, ...) be profiles such that xk = x′k for
all k ≠ i, j, xi = 1, xj = −1 and x′i = x′j = 0, then N+(pi′) = N+(pi)/{i} and N−(pi′) =
N−(pi)/{j}. Letting Mk,l(pi) = 1, we know n+(pi)−n−(pi) > k. Thus, n+(pi′)−n−(pi′) =
n+(pi) − n−(pi) − 1 + 1 > k. Alternatively, if Mk,l(pi) = −1, then n−(pi) − n+(pi) > l
and n−(pi′)−n+(pi′) > l. Hence Mk,l(pi′) = −1. By completeness, if Mk,l(pi) = 0, then
Mk,l(pi′) = 0. Thus Mk,l is cancellative.
Next, consider two profiles pi and pi′ such that pi ≤ pi′ and Mk,l(pi) = 1, so
n+(pi) > n−(pi)+k. Then N+(pi) ⊆ N+(pi′)and N−(pi′) ⊆ N−(pi). Thus n+(pi′) ≥ n+(pi)
and n−(pi′) ≤ n−(pi). Hence, n+(pi′) > n−(pi′) + k, so Mk,l(pi′) = 1. Similarly, for ρ
and ρ′ such that ρ ≥ ρ′ and Mk,l(ρ) = −1, then n−(ρ) > n+(ρ) + l. It follows that
N−(ρ) ⊆ N−(ρ′)and N+(ρ′) ⊆ N+(ρ). Thus n−(ρ′) > n−(ρ) and n+(ρ′) < n+(ρ), so
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Mk,l(ρ′) = −1 and Mk,l is monotone.
While some of our results carried over from the finite model, not all of them
did. You may notice that if k =∞ and l = −∞, that while k + l = 0 ≠ −1, Mk,l(pi) ≠ 0
for any pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N. This shows that the Proposition 3.1 does not hold in the
infinite model. However, we can extend Proposition 3.2 quite naturally.
PROPOSITION 4.4. For any k, l ∈ Z∪ {−∞,∞} such that k ≠ l and k + l ≥ −1, and
any pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N, Mk,l(−pi) = −Ml,k(pi) or Mk,l(pi) = −Ml,k(−pi).
Proof. First, assume both k and l are finite. Let Mk,l(pi) = 1, then n+(pi) > n−(pi)+k.
Thus, n−(−pi) > n+(−pi) + k, so Ml,k(−pi) = −1. Similarly, if Mk,l(pi) = −1, then
n−(pi) > n+(pi) + l. Then n+(−pi) > n−(−pi) + l, hence Ml,k(−pi) = 1. Lastly, if
Mk,l = 0, then neither n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k nor n−(pi) > n+(pi) + l. Therefore, neither
n−(−pi) > n+(−pi) + k nor n+(−pi) > n−(−pi) + l. Thus Ml,k(−pi) = 0. Hence Mk,l(pi) =−Ml,k(−pi).
Next, assume l = ∞ and k = −∞. Let Mk,l(pi) = 1, then n+(pi) > n−(pi) −∞.
Therefore, n−(−pi) > n+(−pi) −∞, so Ml,k(−pi) = −1. If Mk,l(pi) ≠ −1 for any pi. It
follows, if Ml,k(pi) = −1, then it follows Mk,l(−pi) = 1. Notice Mk,l(pi) ≠ −1 for any pi,
and Ml,k(pi) ≠ 1 for any pi. Assume that Mk,l(pi) = 0, then neither n+(pi) > n−(pi)−∞
nor n−(pi) > n+(pi) +∞. Also, it follows neither n−(−pi) > n+(−pi) −∞ nor n+(−pi) >
n−(−pi) +∞, so Ml,k(−pi) = 0.
Lastly, assume k = ∞ and l < ∞. Let Mk,l(pi) = 1, then n+(pi) > n−(pi) +∞.
Thus, n−(−pi) > n+(−pi) +∞, so Ml,k(−pi) = −1. Now, if Mk,l(pi) = −1, then n−(pi) >
n+(pi) + l. Then n+(−pi) > n−(−pi) + l, hence Ml,k(−pi) = 1. Lastly, if Mk,l = 0, then
neither n+(pi) > n−(pi)+∞ nor n−(pi) > n+(pi)+l. Hence neither n−(−pi) > n+(−pi)+∞
nor n+(−pi) > n−(−pi) + l. Thus Ml,k(−pi) = 0.
Since not all of the propositions carried over from the finite model into the
infinite model, is also happens that we have not found a full characterization for
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all of the Mk,l rules in the infinite model. However, if we restrict our k, l to finite
integers, we can include a new axiom that allows for a full characterization of this
subset of Mk,l rules.
DEFINITION 4.5. An infinite aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} sat-
isfies the Strong Zero Co-finite axiom if there exists pi,pi′ ∈ {−1,0,1}N such that
N0(pi) and N0(pi′) are co-finite and {f(pi), f(pi′)} = {−1,1}.
Before characterizing the finite k, l Mk,l rules, we show that they satisfy the
strong zero co-finite axiom.
PROPOSITION 4.5. An infinite aggregation function defined by Mk,l such that
k, l ∈ Z and k + l ≥ −1 satisfies the strong zero co-finite axiom.
Proof. Define pi as the profile such that n+(pi) = k + 1 and n−(pi) = 0. Then
Mk,l(pi) = 1 and N0(pi) is co-finite. Define pi′ to be the profile such that n−(pi′) =
l + 1 and n+(pi) = 0. Then Mk,l(pi′) = −1 and N0(pi′) is co-finite. Therefore{Mk,l(pi),Mk,l(pi′)} = {−1,1}, so Mk,l satisfies the strong zero co-finite axiom.
Now we can characterize the class of finite k, l Mk,l rules.
THEOREM 4.9. An infinite aggregation function f ∶ {−1,0,1}N → {−1,0,1} satis-
fies strong anonymity, cancellation, monotonicity, and strong zero co-finite axiom,
but is not neutral if and only if there exists k, l ∈ Z such that k ≠ l and k + l ≥ −1
such that f =Mk,l.
Proof. We have already shown that Mk,l satisfies all of the axioms listed. Thus, we
can now assume that f satisfies all of our axioms, and we will prove that f =Mk,l.
Now, define k and l as follows.
k = min{n+(pi) − n−(pi) ∶ f(pi) = 1} − 1.
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and
l = min{n−(pi) − n+(pi) ∶ f(pi) = −1} − 1
Since f satisfies strong zero co-finite, neither set is empty, so the minimum exists.
Also, since f satisfies strong zero co-finite, neither k nor l is infinite, as if k(l) =∞,
then f(pi) ≠ 1(−1) for any pi. Thus k, l ∈ Z.
Let κ be a profile such that n+(κ) − n−(κ) = k + 1 and f(κ) = 1. Then let λ
be a profile such that n−(λ)−n+(λ) = l+1 and f(λ) = −1. Our first goal is to verify
that k + l ≥ −1. Since f is cancellative, we may assume that κ satisfies one of the
follow equations:
n+(κ) = 0 and n−(κ) = −k − 1 (4.11)
or
n−(κ) = 0 and n+(κ) = k + 1. (4.12)
Similarly, we may assume that λ satisfies one of the follow equations:
n+(λ) = 0 and n−(λ) = l + 1 (4.13)
or
n−(λ) = 0 and n+(λ) = −l − 1. (4.14)
Suppose Equations (4.11) and (4.14) hold. Then 0⃗ ≥ κ and λ ≥ 0⃗. By
monotonicity, f(0⃗) ≥ f(κ) = 1 and f(λ) = −1 ≥ f(0⃗), which is impossible. Thus
Equations (4.11) and (4.14) cannot hold at the same time.
We cannot have k = l = −1, since then κ = λ = 0⃗ and f(κ) = 1, but f(λ) = −1.
Therefore, if Equations (4.12) and (4.13) hold then k+1 ≥ 0 and l+1 ≥ 0. So k ≥ −1
and l ≥ −1. Since k = l = −1 is impossible, it follows that k + l ≥ −1.
Now, suppose Equations (4.11) and (4.13) hold. Then n+(κ) = n+(λ) = 0, so
n−(κ) = −k − 1 and n−(λ) = l + 1. If k = l = −1, the κ = λ, which cannot hold and
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Mk,l be well defined. Since n−(κ) ≥ 0, −k ≥ −1. Also, since n−(λ) ≥ 0, l ≥ −1. Then
it follows that, since both k and l cannot be −1 at the same time, that
k + l ≥ −1.
If Equations (4.12) and (4.14) hold, then n−(κ) = n+(λ) = 0 and we can argue
like above that k and l cannot both be negative one, and result to find
k + 1 > −l − 1 and so k + l ≥ −1.
At this point, by Lemma 4.6, the Mk,l rule is well defined.
Now, let f(pi) = 1. Then n+(pi) − n−(pi) > k since k + 1 is minimal. Thus
n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k, so Mk,l(pi) = 1. Similarly, let f(pi) = −1. Then n−(pi) − n+(pi) > l
by the minimality of l + 1. So, n−(pi) > n+(pi) + l and Mk,l(pi) = −1.
Next, assume that Mk,l(pi) = 1. This implies that n+(pi) > n−(pi) + k. So
n+(pi) − n−(pi) > k. Since Mk,l is cancellative, there exists pi′ such that Mk,l(pi′) =
Mk,l(pi) and either n+(pi′) = 0 and −n−(pi′) > k or n−(pi′) = 0 and n+(pi′) > k. Since
k ≠ ±∞, κ, a profile that attains the minimum for k + 1 as defined above, exists.
Now, f is cancellative as well, so there exists κ′ such that f(κ) = f(κ′) and either
n+(κ′) = 0 and −n−(κ′) = k + 1 or n−(κ′) = 0 and n+(κ′) = k + 1. Therefore, we can
compare κ′ and pi′ with four cases.
Case 1 Assume n+(pi′) = 0, −n−(pi′) > k and n+(κ′) = 0, −n−(κ′) = k + 1, then 0 ≤
n−(pi′) < −k and 0 ≤ n−(κ′) = −k − 1, hence k ≤ −1. Notice that n−(pi′) ≤ n−(κ)
and so there exists a permutationσ of N such that pi′σ ≥ κ′. Therefore, by
monotonicity of f , f(pi′σ) ≥ f(κ′) = f(κ) = 1. Since f is strongly anonymous,
f(pi′) = f(pi′σ) = 1. Since f is cancellative, f(pi′) = f(pi) = 1.
Case 2 Assume n+(pi′) = 0, −n−(pi′) > k and n−(κ′) = 0, n+(κ′) = k + 1; therefore,
0 ≤ n−(pi′) < −k, so k < 0, and n+(κ′) = k + 1 ≥ 0. Thus, k ≥ −1, but k < 0,
so k = −1. Hence, n−(pi′) < 1, so n−(pi′) = 0. Similarly, n+(κ′) = k + 1 = 0, so
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n+(pi′) = n−(pi′) = n−(κ′) = n+(κ′) = 0. Thus, κ′ = pi′, so f(κ′) = f(pi′) = 1.
Since f is cancellative, f(pi′) = f(pi) = 1.
Case 3 Assume n−(pi′) = 0, n+(pi′) > k and n−(κ′) = 0, −n+(κ′) = k + 1. Since both f
and Mk,l are strongly anonymous, there exists σ ∈ SN such that pi′σ ≥ κ′. There-
fore, by monotonicity of f , f(pi′σ) ≥ f(κ′) = f(κ) = 1. Since f is anonymous,
f(pi′) = f(pi′σ) = 1. Since f is cancellative, f(pi′) = f(pi) = 1.
Case 4 Assume n−(pi′) = 0, n+(pi′) > k and n+(κ′) = 0, −n−(κ′) = k + 1. Then 0 ≤
n−(κ′) = −k − 1, so k ≤ −1, but n+(pi′) > k. Therefore, pi′ ≥ (0,0,0, ...) and(0,0,0, ...) ≥ κ′. Thus by transitivity, pi′ ≥ κ′, so by monotonicity f(pi′) ≥
f(κ′) = f(κ) = 1. Since f is cancellative, f(pi) = f(pi′) = 1.
Similarly, assume that Mk,l(pi) = −1. Therefore, it follows that n−(pi) −
n+(pi) > l. Since Mk,l is cancellative, there exists pi′ such that Mk,l(pi′) = Mk,l(pi)
and either n−(pi′) = 0 and −n+(pi′) > l or n−(pi′) = 0 and n−(pi′) > k. Since l ≠ ±∞,
λ, a profile that attains the minimum for l + 1 as defined above, exists. Now, f is
cancellative as well, so there exists λ′ such that f(λ) = f(λ′) and either n+(λ′) = 0
and n−(λ′) = k + 1 or n−(λ′) = 0 and −n+(λ′) = k + 1. Therefore, we can compare λ′
and pi′ with four cases.
Case 1 Assume n−(pi′) = 0, −n+(pi′) > l and n−(λ′) = 0, −n+(λ′) = l + 1. Therefore,
0 ≤ n+(pi′) < −l and 0 ≤ n+(λ′) = −l − 1. Since both f and Mk,l are strongly
anonymous, there exists σ ∈ SN such that pi′σ ≤ λ′. Therefore, by monotonicity
of f , f(pi′σ) ≤ f(λ′) = f(λ) = −1. Since f is anonymous, f(pi′) = f(pi′σ) = −1.
Since f is cancellative, f(pi′) = f(pi) = −1.
Case 2 Assume n+(pi′) = 0, n−(pi′) > l and n−(λ′) = 0, −n+(λ′) = l + 1. So 0 ≤ n+(λ′) =−l−1 and n−(pi′) > l. So pi′ ≤ (0,0,0, ...) and λ′ ≥ (0,0,0, ...), so by transitivity
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pi′ ≤ λ′. Therefore, since f is monotone, f(pi′) ≤ f(λ′) = f(λ) = −1. Since f is
cancellative, f(pi) = f(pi′) = −1.
Case 3 Assume n+(pi′) = 0, n−(pi′) > l and n+(λ′) = 0, n−(λ′) = l+1. Since both f and
Mk,l are strongly anonymous, there exists σ ∈ SN such that pi′σ ≤ λ′. Therefore,
by monotonicity of f , f(pi′σ) ≤ f(λ′) = f(λ) = −1. Since f is anonymous,
f(pi′) = f(pi′σ) = −1. Since f is cancellative, f(pi′) = f(pi) = −1.
Case 4 Assume n−(pi′) = 0, −n+(pi′) > l and n+(λ′) = 0, n−(λ′) = l + 1. Then 0 ≤
n+(pi′) < −l , so l < 0, and 0 ≤ n−(λ′) = l + 1, so l + 1 ≥ 0. Thus l ≥ −1 and
l < 0, so l = −1. Therefore, n+(pi′) < 1 and n−(λ′) = 0. So n−(pi′) = n+(pi′) =
n+(λ′) = n−(λ′) = 0. Hence pi′ = λ′, so f(pi′) = f(λ′) = f(λ) = −1. Since f is
cancellative, f(pi) = f(pi′) = −1.
Thus, we have shown that for all pi ∈ {−1,0,1}N, f(pi) = 1 if and only if Mk,l(pi) = 1
and f(pi) = −1 if and only if Mk,l(pi) = −1. Therefore, it can be concluded that
f(pi) = 0 if and only if Mk,l(pi) = 0, so f(pi) =Mk,l(pi).
The Theorems in this Chapter have completely characterized the Mk rules for
the infinite model with a countably infinite set of voters. While this extends many
of the results from Chapter 3, we have not yet looked deeper into characterizing the
infinite aggregation functions that do not satisfy neutrality. Doing so, and extending
Corollary 3.3 and its preceding Theorems, has been left for future work.
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CHAPTER 5
DIFFERENCE OF VOTES RULES ON THE FUZZY VOTING MODEL
Now that the Mk and Mk,l rules have been characterized in our first two
models, we will look at the third and final model which we call the fuzzy voting
model. Extending the Mk rules to the fuzzy model was first done by Garcia-Lapresta
and Llamazares in 2010 [8]. They were able to completely characterize these rules
in the fuzzy model. Our goal in this chapter is to give a new proof of the main result
given in [8]. We will first state and prove two new lemmas and use them to prove
the characterization of the Mk rules in the fuzzy domain, similar to our previous
models.
Recall that in the fuzzy decision model, there are two definitions for the
difference of votes rules. These two classes of functions are known as the M̃k rules
defined in Definition 2.26 and the M̃ ′k rules defined in Definition 2.27. They are
stated again below for convenience. In this section, we will use the notation sum(pi)
to indicate the sum of all the entries in the profile pi. That is if pi = (d1, d2, ..., dm),
then sum(pi) = m∑
i=1di.
DEFINITION 5.1. Given a real number k ∈ [0,m), the fuzzy M̃k majority is the





i=1di > 12 + k2m ,
1
2 if ∣ 1m m∑
i=1di − 12 ∣ ≤ k2m ,
0 if 1m
m∑
i=1di < 12 − k2m .
(5.1)
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DEFINITION 5.2. Given a real number k ∈ (0,m], the fuzzy M̃ ′k majority is the





i=1di ≥ 12 + k2m ,
1
2 if ∣ 1m m∑
i=1di − 12 ∣ < k2m ,
0 if 1m
m∑
i=1di ≤ 12 − k2m .
(5.2)
Before stating our lemmas, we will confirm that both the M̃k and M̃ ′k classes
of fuzzy aggregation functions satisfy the axioms necessary for the characterization.
THEOREM 5.1. For any k ∈ [0,m) the fuzzy aggregation function M̃k satisfies
cancellation, Pareto, monotonicity and neutrality.
Proof. For this proof, we will use the definition of M̃k given in Equation (2.7). First,
note that the output of M̃k is completely determined by the sum(pi) and the value
of k.
We will now show that M̃k is cancellative. Consider pi = (d1, d2, ..., dm), such
that sum(pi) = M . Suppose pi′ = (d′1, d′2, ...d′m) satisfies d′i = di + , d′j = dj − , and
d′k = dk for all k ≠ i, j. Then it follows that sum(pi′) = M −  +  = M = sum(pi).
Since k is fixed, it follows that M̃k(pi) = M̃k(pi′).
Next we will show that M̃k is Pareto. Consider M̃k(0,0, ...,0). It follows that
sum(0,0, ...,0) = 0, and 12(m−k) is minimal as k approaches m, since k <m. Thus,
for all k, 12(m − k) > 0 = sum(0,0, ...,0), hence M̃k(0,0, ...,0) = 0. Now consider
M̃k(1,1, ...,1). It follows that sum(1,1, ...,1) = m, and 12(m + k) is maximal as k
approaches m, since k < m. Therefore, 12(m + k) < m = sum(1,1, ...,1). Hence
M̃k(1,1, ...,1) = 1 and M̃k is Pareto.
Now we will show that M̃k is neutral. Consider N(pi). We can easily see
that sum(N(pi)) = m∑
i=1(1 − di) = m − sum(pi). Furthermore, if M̃k(pi) = 1, then
sum(pi) > 12(m + k), so sum(N(pi)) =m − sum(pi) <m − 12(m + k) = 12(m − k). Thus
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M̃k(N(pi)) = −1. Similarly, if M̃k(pi) = −1, then by the same algebra, M̃k(N(pi)) = 1.
Lastly, if M̃k(pi) = 0, then ∣sum(pi) − m2 ∣ ≤ 12k. It follows that
∣sum(N(pi)) − m
2






= ∣sum(pi) − m
2
∣.
Therefore, ∣sum(N(pi)) − m2 ∣ = ∣sum(pi) − m2 ∣ ≤ 12k, so M̃k(N(pi)) = 0. Hence M̃k is
neutral.
Finally, we will show that M̃k is monotone. Let pi′ ≥ pi, then it follows that
sum(pi′) ≥ sum(pi). Therefore, by the definition of M̃k it is clear that M̃k(pi′) ≥
M̃k(pi).
Next, we need to show that class of fuzzy aggregation functions M̃ ′k rules
satisfy cancellation, Pareto, monotonicity and neutrality, as well. This class of
fuzzy aggregation functions is markedly different than the M̃k rules, even though
that may not be obvious at first. Before proving the theorem about this class of
functions, consider this remark, to understand the differences and necessity of two
proofs.
REMARK 5.1. The M̃ ′k rules allow for values of k ∈ (0,m], which allows for k =m.
In this case, notice that M̃ ′k(pi) = 1 only if sum(pi) = m, and M̃ ′k(pi) = 0 only if
sum(pi) = 0. However, M̃k allows for values of k ∈ [0,m), so while k ≠ m, it does
allow k = 0, which cannot happen in the M̃ ′k rules. With k = 0, the M̃k = f̃m, the
fuzzy simple majority rule. There are other slight differences in the M̃k and M̃ ′k
rules, based on whether the sum is strictly less(greater) than or whether its allowed
to be less(greater) than or equal to. While these differences seem slight at first, the
difference is distinct and necessary when considering the range of k for each class
of functions. So, while they are inherently similar, these two classes are functions
are indeed two different classes of functions.
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Now, we may continue with the proof for M̃ ′k rules.
THEOREM 5.2. For any k ∈ (0,m] the fuzzy aggregation functions M̃ ′k satisfies
cancellation, Pareto, monotonicity and neutrality.
Proof. For this proof, we will use the definition of M̃ ′k given in Equation (2.8). First,
note that, as with the previous proof, the output of M̃ ′k is completely determined
by the sum(pi) and the value of k.
We will now show that M̃ ′k is cancellative. Consider pi = (d1, d2, ..., dm), such
that sum(pi) = S. Then for pi′ = (d′1, d′2, ...d′m) such that d′i = di + , d′j = dj − , and
d′k = dk for all k ≠ i, j. Then it follows that sum(pi′) = S −  +  = S = sum(pi). Since
k is fixed, it follows that M̃ ′k(pi) = M̃ ′k(pi′).
Next we will show that M̃ ′k is Pareto. Consider M̃ ′k(0,0, ...,0). It follows that
sum(0,0, ...,0) = 0. Also 12(m−k) is minimal when k =m, and 12(m−m) = 0. Thus,
for all k, 12(m − k) ≥ 0 = sum(0,0, ...,0), hence M̃ ′k(0,0, ...,0) = 0. Now consider
M̃ ′k(1,1, ...,1). It follows that sum(1,1, ...,1) = m, and 12(m + k) is maximal when
k = m, and 12(m + m) = m. Therefore, 12(m + k) ≤ m = sum(1,1, ...,1). Hence
M̃ ′k(1,1, ...,1) = 1 and M̃ ′k is Pareto.
Now we will show that M̃ ′k is neutral. Consider N(pi). We can easily see
that sum(N(pi)) = m∑
i=1(1 − di) = m − sum(pi). Furthermore, if M̃ ′k(pi) = 1, then
sum(pi) ≥ 12(m + k), so sum(N(pi)) =m − sum(pi) ≤m − 12(m + k) = 12(m − k). Thus
M̃ ′k(N(pi)) = −1. Similarly, if M̃ ′k(pi) = −1, then by the same algebra, M̃ ′k(N(pi)) = 1.
Lastly, if M̃ ′k(pi) = 0, then ∣sum(pi) − m2 ∣ < 12k. It follows that
∣sum(N(pi)) − m
2






= ∣sum(pi) − m
2
∣.
Therefore, ∣sum(N(pi)) − m2 ∣ = ∣sum(pi) − m2 ∣ < 12k, so M̃ ′k(N(pi)) = 0. Hence M̃ ′k is
neutral.
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Finally, we will show that M̃ ′k is monotone. Let pi′ ≥ pi, then it follows that
sum(pi′) ≥ sum(pi). Therefore, by the definition of M̃ ′k it is clear that M̃ ′k(pi′) ≥
M̃ ′k(pi).
The definition of the various axioms were presented in Chapter 2. To begin
looking at the fuzzy model, we will prove a few lemmas based on these axioms. The
first lemma, requires only that the function be cancellative, as it was proven by
Garcia-Lapresta and Llamazares that cancellation completely implies anonymity in
this model [8].
LEMMA 5.1. Let the fuzzy decision rule F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} satisfy cancellation.
For any two profiles pi = (x1, ..., xm) and ρ = (y1, ..., ym) such that sum(pi) = sum(ρ),
then F (pi) = F (ρ).
Proof. We will use induction on the length of the profile m to prove this lemma.
First, assume that m = 2, then x1 + x2 = y1 + y2. Without loss of generality, let
x1 ≥ y1, if x1 = y1, then x2 = y2, and we are done, so assume the contrary. Then
there exists some  > 0 such that x1 = y1 +  and x2 = y2 − . Thus, by cancellation,
F (pi) = F (ρ).
Now, we will assume that the cancellation condition holds for m − 1 length
profiles, m ≥ 3.
Case 1: Suppose there exists j such that xj = yj, define the mapping G ∶[0,1]m−1 → {0, 12 ,1} by G(z1, ..., zm−1) = F (α), where α = (a1, a2, ..., am) such that
aj = xj, ai = zi for i < j and α(i) = zi−1 for i ≥ j + 1. G is cancellative, since F is
cancellative. So, define pi′ = (x′1, ..., x′m)ρ′ = (y′1, ..., y′m) ∈ [0,1]m−1 such that x′i = xi
for i < j, and x′i = xi+1 for i ≥ j, and ρ′ is defined similarly. Then G(pi′) = F (pi)
and G(ρ′) = F (ρ). Now, sum(pi′) = sum(pi) − xj and sum(ρ′) = sum(ρ) − yj. Since
xj = yj and sum(pi) = sum(ρ), it follow that sum(pi′) = sum(ρ′). Thus, by our
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inductive hypothesis, G(pi′) = G(ρ′). Hence, by our definition of G, G(pi′) = F (pi) =
F (ρ) = G(ρ′).
Case 2: Suppose no such j exists such that xj = yj, that is xi ≠ yi for all i.
Then, consider E = {∣xj − yj ∣ ∶ i = 1,2, ...,m} and let  = minE, and call one of the
terms where this occurs j. Without loss of generality, let xj > yj. Then there exists
i ∈ Nm such that xi < yi, since sum(pi) = sum(ρ). Create ρ′ such that y′j = yj + ,
y′i = yi −  and yk = yk, for all k ≠ i, j. Then, by cancellation, F (ρ′) = F (ρ). Now,
consider F (pi) and F (ρ′), by construction, y′j = xj. Then, we can use Case 1 to
assert that F (pi) = F (ρ′). Thus, by transitivity, F (pi) = F (ρ).
Next, monotonicity is added to the axioms the fuzzy aggregation function
satisfies. Once that is done, we can compare the output of the function on two
profiles, pi and ρ, based solely on sum(pi) and sum(ρ).
LEMMA 5.2. Let the fuzzy decision rule F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} satisfy cancellation
and monotonicity. For any two profiles pi = (x1, ..., xm) and ρ = (y1, ..., ym) such
that sum(pi) ≤ sum(ρ), then F (pi) ≤ F (ρ).
Proof. If sum(pi) = sum(ρ), we know from Lemma 5.1 that F (pi) = F (ρ). So
we will assume that sum(pi) < sum(ρ). Then there exists some  > 0, such that
sum(ρ) = sum(pi) +m. Create ρ′ = (y′1, ..., y′m) such that y′i = min{xi + ,1} for
all i ∈ Nm. Then note that pi ≤ ρ′ and sum(ρ) ≥ sum(ρ′) ≥ sum(pi). Then let
δ = m∑
i=1  − (yi − xi). Notice
δ = sum(pi) +m − sum(ρ′). If δ = 0, then let ρ̃ = ρ′.
If δ > 0, create ρ̃ as follows, so that sum(ρ̃) = sum(ρ′) + δ = sum(ρ). For
i = 1,2, ...,m − 1, let δi = y′i + δi−1 − 1 with the convention δ0 = δ. For example
δ1 = ρ′(1) + δ − 1. If δ1 ≤ 0, then ρ̃ is defined by
ρ̃ = y′1 + δ, y + 2′, y′3, ..., y′m).
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If δ1 > 0 and δ2 ≤ 0, the ρ̃ is defined by
ρ̃ = (1, y + 2′ + δ1, y′3, ..., y′m).
This pattern continues until we either find the first index i such that δi > 0 and
δi+1 ≤ 0 or we get δi > 0 for all i = 1,2, ...,m − 1. Observe that
δm−1 = y′m−1 + δm−2 − 1
= (y′m−1 − 1) + +ρ′(m − 2) + δm−3





i=1 y′i − (m − 1) + δ
Since δ = sum(ρ) − sum(ρ′), we can determine
δm−1 =m−1∑
i=1 y′i − (m − 1) + sum(ρ) − sum(ρ′)= − y′m −m + 1 + sum(ρ)
y′m + δm−1 =sum(ρ) −m + 1
≤ m −m + 1
=1.
If δm−1 ≥ 0, then ρ̃ = (z1, ..., zm) = (1,1, ...,1, y′m + δm−1). If δm−1 ≤ 0, then there
exists a first index j such that 1 ≤ j ≤ m − 1, δj ≤ 0, and δi > 0 for all integers
i ∈ [0, j − 1]. In this case, we let zi = 1 for all i < j, zj = y′j + δj−1, and zk = y′k
for all integers k ∈ [j + 1,m]. Therefore, sum(ρ) = sum(ρ′) + δ = sum(ρ̃), so by
Lemma5.1, F (ρ) = F (ρ̃). Furthermore, each zi ≥ xi, it follows from monotonicity
that F (pi) ≤ F (ρ̃). Hence F (pi) ≤ F (ρ).
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These two lemmas allow us to prove the Llamazares and Garcia-Lapresta
characterization result of the M̃k and M̃ ′k rules[8]. Our proof uses a different ap-
proach than Llamazares and Garcia-Lapresta, but has the same conclusion.
THEOREM 5.3. Let F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} satisfy cancellation, Pareto, monotonic-
ity and neutrality, then F is either an M̃k or M̃ ′k rule.
Proof. Consider F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} and let k = inf{2sum(pi) −m : F (pi) = 1}.
Now since F is Pareto, F (1,1, ...,1) = 1 and since F is neutral, F (12 , 12 , ..., 12) = 12 . We
know sum(12 , 12 , ..., 12) = 12m and sum(1,1, ...,1) = 1 so by Lemma 5.2, if F (pi) = 1,
1
2m < sum(pi) ≤ m. So 0 < k ≤ m. If there exists a profile ρ such that F (ρ) = 1 and
2sum(ρ) −m = k, then we will show that F = M̃ ′k rule with this k. Otherwise, we
will show that F = M̃k rule.
First, assume that F attains its infimum. Let pi = (d1, d2, ..., dm) and assume
that F (pi) = 1. By Lemma 5.2 and the nature of the infimum, 2sum(pi) −m ≥ k.
Since sum(pi) ≥ 12(m + k), it follows from Equation (2.8) that M̃k′(pi) = 1.
Now assume that F (pi) = 0. Since F is neutral, F (N(pi)) = 1. Therefore,
2sum(N(pi))−m ≥ k, so m−2sum(pi) ≥ k. Since sum(pi) ≤ 12(m−k) it follows from
Equation (2.27) that M̃k
′(pi) = 0.
Now, let F (pi) = 12 , then neither 2sum(pi) −m ≥ k nor m − 2sum(pi) ≥ k;
therefore, ∣sum(pi) − m2 ∣ < k2 and so M̃k′(pi) = 12 .
Finally, assume that there does not exist a profile ρ such that F (ρ) = 1 and
2sum(ρ) − m = k. Let F (pi) = 1, then from Lemma 5.2 and the nature of the
infimum, 2sum(pi) −m > k. Thus 1m m∑
i=1di > 12 + k2m , so M̃k(pi) = 1.
Now, let F (pi) = 0, then since F is neutral, F (N(pi)) = 1. Therefore,
2sum(N(pi)) −m > k, so m − 2sum(pi) > k, so M̃k(pi) = 0.
Lastly, let F (pi) = 12 , then neither 2sum(pi) −m > k nor m − 2sum(pi) > k;
therefore, ∣sum(pi) − m2 ∣ ≤ k2 , so M̃k(pi) = 12 .
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Combining Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 with Theorem 5.3, the following corollary
falls out as a consequence and confirms the main result from the Garcia-Lapresta
and Llamazares [8].
COROLLARY 5.1. A fuzzy aggregation function F ∶ [0,1]m → {0, 12 ,1} satisfies
cancellation, Pareto, monotonicity and neutrality if and only if F = M̃k or F = M̃ ′k.
The fuzzy aggregation model is the third and final model where we explored
the difference of votes rules. It is notable that when characterizing these rules
in this model and the infinite model, an additional axiom was needed as opposed
to characterizing these rules in the finite model. In the fuzzy model, we had the
addition of Pareto, and in our infinite model, we had the addition of the zero co-
finite axiom. We were not able to look into the extended difference of votes rules
that are not neutral, as we did in the previous two models. Though, we believe a
similar characterization can be proven. This characterization will be left for future
work. The next Chapter will discuss the application of such rules, by the use of
computer simulations and statistics to predict the variability of such rules from the
simple majority rule function in the appropriate model.
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CHAPTER 6
SIMULATING DIFFERENCE OF VOTES RULES AND OTHER VOTING
RULES
In this chapter, we take a turn and look at making comparisons between
two voting rules in the finite voting model. Theoretically, we can calculate the
probability that Llamazares’ difference of votes rule (Mk) would have an output
that is different than that of the simple majority rule function (SMR). However,
through computer simulations we can look at the actual difference that occurs. It
turns out the probability we thought would hold did not hold in simulation and
indicates there is more going on than we immediately thought. Furthermore, we
can use computer simulations to compare the output of simple majority rule with
the output of the Electoral College. The Electoral College is the voting method used
by the United States to elect its President. First, we will compare the hypothesized
agreement to the simulation agreement of the Mk rule with (SMR). Then we will
compare the Electoral College to simple majority rule. While the Electoral College
is not in the class of functions we discussed in the previous chapters, we wanted to
use it since it is such an important voting method in the United States. Our hope is
that the simulation and analysis given in this chapter will provide some insight into
the electoral system in the United States. For this chapter, we will be assuming
that we are in the finite aggregation model, but will not have a fixed value of the
size of the voting population N , in fact we will look at what happens as this number
changes.
First, let’s take a look at the theoretical set of profiles where an Mk rule,
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with k ≥ 1, would differ from (SMR). Recall that (SMR) can be defined using the
difference of vote rule M0. We will let ∣N ∣ = N . We can see that for each N , there
are 3N profiles. However, for all pi = (x1, x2, ..., xN) ∈ {−1,0,1}N , both aggregation
functions can be determined solely by n+(pi)−n−(pi) = N∑
i=1xi. Thus we assumed that
we need to only count the profiles in pi that have different sums. So initially, the
idea was this. There are 2N + 1 different possible sums. For each k, there are 2k
sums where Mk rules differ from (SMR). Therefore, we can say the probability that
the outputs differ is
2k
2N + 1 (6.1)
If we want the outputs to differ at a level that is statistically significant, then for
some 0 < α < 1, we need
2k
2N + 1 > α





That is to say, we want N to be smaller than kα − 12 forMk and (SMR) to have a
statistically significant difference of their outputs at a level of α = .05. With k = 10
and α = .05, that would require your population to be less than 200 for the Mk to
vary from (SMR) significantly. However, in our simulation, this looks to be off. This
program was run ten times, generating 1,000 comparisons with N > 200 and k = 10,
and the difference in the outputs was highly significant. Whereas, this hypothesis
would indicate the difference would be statistically insignificant. An example of one
of the runs of the program can be noticed below in Figure 6.1.
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Figure 6.1: For N = 211 and k = 10, the Mk v. (SMR).
Notice that with N = 211, as in Figure 6.1, we get a probability of agreement
of 0.31. This is a very low probability of agreement. As mentioned above, this same
simulation was run many times, with similar results. When looking further into
this, it was determined that we were not including the number of different times
when each sum occurs, but how to include this seems unclear. Notice that while
there is only one way to get a sum of N , there are N ways to get a sum of N − 1,
and N(N+12 ways to get a sum of N − 2. Now, most of these cancel out, as they will
get the same output in Mk as in (SMR). Determining this statistically proved to be
harder than expected. Therefore, it was easier to use simulations to get an estimate
of the relationship between k and N . For the results to be meaningful, we must fix
k and adjust the values of N . Therefore, we ran the simulation with fixed k = 10
and growing numbers of N , we can see that N must be much larger in order for the
results to not be significant. The reader can look at the code that generated these
results in the Appendix. Some of the results are highlighted below.
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Figure 6.2: For N = 1000 and k = 10, the Mk v. (SMR).
Figure 6.3: For N = 1750 and k = 10, the Mk v. (SMR).
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Figure 6.4: For N = 2000 and k = 10, the Mk v. (SMR).
Figure 6.5: For N = 2000 and k = 10, the Mk v. (SMR).
84
Figure 6.6: For N = 5000 and k = 10, the Mk v. (SMR).
Figure 6.7: For N = 8500 and k = 10, the Mk v. (SMR).
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Figure 6.8: For N = 9500 and k = 10, the Mk v. (SMR).
Figure 6.9: For N = 9300 and k = 10, the Mk v. (SMR).
The above figures show that the outputs of the Mk rule and (SMR) did not
become statistically close to identical until N = 9500. It was not until N = 9500, that
in 500 trials we were able to get similarity with 95% probability. In this simulation,
we see that while the difference of votes rules looks to be very close to (SMR), the
two aggregation functions differ quite significantly for N < 90k. While this is not
a mathematically proven result, it is an applicable modeling that we can use to
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estimate the relationship between k and N .
Now, we would like to give an application of this simulator on two aggregation
functions that come up quite often when discussing voting theory. One of these
two voting methods is commonly referred to as “popular vote,” but is the same as
(SMR). The other voting method is known as the Electoral College. In the Electoral
College, voters vote for electors that then vote for the winner. The Appendix
contains all of the C# code used for this simulation, if the reader wants to see the
entirety of how the Electoral College is calculated. In this section, we will explain
some assumptions made, then give a brief overview of the calculations, as they are
quite involved.
When analyzing the results, it is important to note there were a few as-
sumptions made. The first assumption is that all of the states use winner take all
elector appointment. While there are a few states that do not, this has not affected
the outcome of any election in history. The second assumption made was that the
electors use (SMR) to pick the winner of the election. In actuality, the winner has
to receive 270 of the 538 votes, which is one more that 50%. Our assumption allows
for the output of 0 if both candidates receive 269 votes, but in all of our simulations,
the Electoral College function has never output 0. Also, our simulation makes one
large profile and then partitions the profile based on the population of each state,
alphabetically. Therefore, another assumption is that the population of each state
was fixed with the population determined by the 2010 Census. The Census popu-
lation determines the number of electors that each state receives, but if a number
of people moved after the Census, this could change where the partition should
occur in the profile. However, the state populations have not changed drastically in
recent years. In the case of extreme movement away from or to any state(s), this
simulation should be reworked.
For example, we started with Alabama where 1.5% of the population of
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the United States live, so we multiplied our N by 0.015, and made the Alabama
partition go from the first voter to the 0.015 ⋅N voter. If the ending number was
not an integer, the program rounded down, because if we rounded up, there could
be an error in the program not being able to run on the states at the end. Once
the Alabama partition was made, (SMR) was run on the votes in that partition.
The alternative chosen by the Alabama partition was then inputted into a weighted
majority rule function, with all the other states partitions’ outcomes. Each state’s
choice, 1, −1, or 0, was then multiplied by the number of Electoral College votes it
has. In example, Alabama’s choice would be multiplied by six. All of these weighted
alternative choices are then summed together and the sign function determines the
output. That is, if the sign is positive, 1 is chosen, and if the sign is negative, −1 is
chosen.
With each run of the simulation, our simulator generates 100 profiles at a
time of size N and runs each of them through both aggregation functions. The
constant function 1 and the constant function -1 were used as control functions
to make sure that the profiles we were working with were truly a random sample.
Below we have included one of these tests, that shows the constant function 1 agrees
with (SMR) about 50% of the time. This comparison was also run with the Electoral
College, generating a similar result.
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Figure 6.10: For N = 300,000,000 the Constant Function 1 v. (SMR).
When starting this simulation, it was hypothesized that as N grew, the prob-
ability of agreement between the two voting methods would become more precise,
or that the variance in the simulations would shrink. This was thought because we
assumed that the true probability of difference would be more distinct for larger
N . It was also hypothesized that as N grew the probability of disagreement would
increase. This hypothesis was based on the fact that out of the 58 presidential
elections in the history of the United States of America, only five have resulted in
the Electoral College picking a different winner than the candidate that won the
popular vote. Moreover, two of these five elections happened in the past 20 years,
when the voter population of the United States is now more than 5,000 times the
size of the voter population in the first election in 1792. There were only 28,579
voters in the first presidential election and in 2016 there were nearly 139,000,000
[15]. Since we can see from historical evidence that the popular vote and the Elec-
toral College disagreed on 5 times in 55 elections, we would hypothesize that the
overall probability of agreement would be close to 90%, since that is the historical
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average.
When we started to run the simulations, the averages for each value of N
seemed to be fairly close to each other, with outliers for both small and large N .
Some notable outliers include an agreement as low as 49% and as high as 92%. It
is important to note, we ran the program 10 times generating 1000 comparisons at
N = 2000 and 10 times generating 1000 comparisons at N = 300,000,000. Once all
of these were run, the percent of agreement for N = 2000 was 82.1% with a standard
deviation of 10.47, and for N = 300,000,000 was 75.5% with a standard deviation
of 9.65. These values were calculated with the help of Microsoft Excel. This Excel
sheet also ran a T-Test analysis to determine if there was a statistically significant
difference in the means, as well as an F-Test to see if their was a statistically
significant difference in the variances. With an α level of 0.10, the T-Test showed
that the means were statistically significant. This indicates that the probability of
agreement for N = 300,000,000 is actually statistically smaller than the probability
of agreement for N = 2000. While that seems to affirm our hypothesis, this would
not hold true for smaller α levels. Therefore, a more powerful CPU would be needed
to generate more simulations, faster, in order to get a more affirming result. While
the T-Test seems to affirm our hypothesis, the F-Test clearly rejected the hypothesis
that the variance would get smaller for larger values of N . The results of these tests
are listed below.
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Figure 6.11: Statistical Values Used for Calculations and Conclusions
In each of our simulations, whether N = 2,000 or N = 500,000,000, the like-
lihood of agreement was almost always between 75% and 88%, with a few outliers.
We expected that maybe this likelihood would get closer to a more constant number
as N grew, however, that was not the case. Below are three of these runs of the
simulation.
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Figure 6.12: For N = 2000 the Electoral College v. (SMR).
Figure 6.13: For N = 300,000,000 the Electoral College v. (SMR).
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Figure 6.14: For N = 300,000,000 the Electoral College v. (SMR).
For these large values of N , the simulator took 20-30 minutes to run. While
the simulation was run on 300,000,000 multiple times, it was not run as many
times on 500,000,000, since the result seemed to be similar after two runs, or 200
comparisons. The average, over 1,000 comparisons, with varying values of N was
79% agreement. This percentage was lower than hypothesized, but not unbelievable.
However, this is more than 10% smaller than our historical average.
In order to truly determine if N is significant in the agreement between
(SMR) and the Electoral College, we need a computer with a larger memory and
more powerful CPU. This will allow for many more comparisons to be run at once.
Once we do that, we can better compare the percent of agreement. Hopefully we





In this dissertation we explored three different voting models, analyzing the
classes of difference of votes rules in each. In the finite aggregation model, we
characterized a new extension, the Mk,l rules, as well as characterizing all finite
aggregation rules that satisfied only two axioms: cancellation and monotonicity.
From there, these difference of votes rules were extended into the infinite model.
There was no previous characterization of the difference of votes rules in the infinite
model. So we first defined and characterized the Mk rules and then extended the
definition of the Mk,l rules. In the third model, the fuzzy aggregation model, the Mk
rules were defined and characterized in previous research, but we re-examined them
to find a proof of the characterization in line with the previous two models. Lastly,
a computer simulation was used to analyze the probability of agreement between
the outputs of an Mk rule with k = 10 and simple majority rule (SMR), as well as
other voting methods that are commonly used. This simulation showed that the
difference of votes rules agreed with (SMR) less often than we expected.
In the finite voting model, a notable characterization was that of May in 1952,
which used neutrality, anonymity and strict monotonicity to characterize (SMR).
All of the characterizations in this paper have utilized the axiom of cancellation,
which was not part of May’s characterization, but is an axiom satisfied by (SMR).
While cancellation can easily seem like an axiom one would want an aggregation
function to satisfy, cancellation does not allow for the voting rule to demand a
certain percentage of the population to not abstain. This means, for any voter set
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N of size n and integer k, we could determine a winner with only k + 1 voters not
abstaining. This could present a problem when n is significantly larger than k.
There have been a number of characterizations of various classes of voting
rules given in the finite model where the axiom of cancellation was not used. Ex-
amples of such characterizations can be found in the work by Hoots and Powers
[9], Dasgupta and Maskin [4], as well as Perry and Powers [16], and many others
[17], [10]. These characterizations look further into anonymity and monotonicity
without including cancellation. Other extensions of May’s Theorem can be found
in the work by Asan and Sanver[1], [2], as well as Cato [3]. With the addition of
our characterizations, the only axiom that has yet to be completely eliminated is
anonymity. Our research has eliminated anonymity, but by including cancellation,
we did not completely eliminate it. The next step is to possibly characterize the
class of voting rules that satisfy only strict monotonicity and neutrality.
May’s Theorem was extended to the infinite voting model by Fey [5], but his
characterization used a different representation for the alternatives than was used
in the finite voting model. By defining the alternatives in this model to mimic the
finite model, we were able to redefine the axioms to extend naturally from the finite
model. After doing this, we were able to extend many of the results from the finite
model. In particular, we were able to characterize the Mk and Mk,l rules in the
finite model. However, we were not able to completely describe the class of infinite
aggregation rules that satisfy only monotonicity and cancellation. A solution to
this problem will require more analysis and is significantly more complex since one
needs to consider cases where a subset of voters is infinite.
The fuzzy aggregation model has been used to deal with preference intensities
and was first introduced by H. Nurmi [13]. Garcia-Lapresta and Llamazares defined
the Mk rules in the fuzzy model and were able to characterize them. While we were
able to redefine these rules to be more in line with our definition of the Mk rules in
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the finite model, and verify the Garcia-Lapresta and Llamazares’ characterization
of the fuzzy Mk rules, we were not able to characterize a fuzzy version of the Mk,l
rules. However, the lemmas that were introduced and proven in this thesis should
be of assistance in solving this problem.
The computer simulation modeled a truly random sampling of voting profiles.
This data showed that while historically the Electoral College only disagreed with
popular vote roughly 9% of the time, its probability of disagreement is actually much
higher. While this simulator gives profiles that are truly random, that randomness
could be part of the reason that the probability is different from the actual practice
of the voting methods. Another step would be to try to make the voting profiles
more in-line with what we see in the United States, with no more than 60% choosing
any one alternative and no less than 40% choosing any one alternative. This may
or may not effect the comparison of the voting methods, but may be able to give
some additional insight into the matter.
The focus of this thesis has been on three voting models and yet there are
other models one could consider. For example, we could allow the size of the voting
population to be the cardinality of R, the real numbers. For more information on
this model see the article by K. Surekha and K.P.S Bhaskara Rao [18].
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APPENDIX
Below is the C# code used to calculate the various aggregation functions












public int SMR(int[] rho, int start, int stop, out int fs)
{
int total = 0;






















public int DVR(int[] rho, out int dr)
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{int pos = 0;
int neg = 0;
int count;
foreach (int i in rho)
{












count = Math.Abs(pos - neg);
int choose = pos - neg;
















public int WMR(int[] rho, out int fb)
{
//state variables, alphabetical
int total = 0;
int A = 0;
int B = 0;
int C = 0;
int D = 0;
int E = 0;
int f = 0;
int g = 0;
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int h = 0;
int i = 0;
int j = 0;
int k = 0;
int l = 0;
int m = 0;
int n = 0;
int o = 0;
int p = 0;
int q = 0;
int r = 0;
int s = 0;
int t = 0;
int u = 0;
int v = 0;
int w = 0;
int x = 0;
int y = 0;
int Aa = 0;
int Bb = 0;
int Cc = 0;
int Dd = 0;
int Ee = 0;
int ff = 0;
int gg = 0;
int hh = 0;
int ii = 0;
int jj = 0;
int kk = 0;
int ll = 0;
int mm = 0;
int nn = 0;
int oo = 0;
int pp = 0;
int qq = 0;
int rr = 0;
int ss = 0;
int tt = 0;
int uu = 0;
int vv = 0;
int ww = 0;
int xx = 0;
int yy = 0;
int zz = 0; //District of Columbia
//state population variables by percentage
double Ap = (N * 0.015);
double Bp = (Ap + (N * 0.0023));
double Cp = (Bp + (N * 0.0212));
double Dp = (Cp + (N * 0.0093));
double ep = (Dp + (N * 0.1218));
double fp = (ep + (N * 0.0170));
double gp = (fp + (N * 0.0113));
101
double hp = (gp + (N * 0.0029));
double ip = (hp + (N * 0.0631));
double jp = (ip + (N * 0.0318));
double kp = (jp + (N * 0.0045));
double lp = (kp + (N * 0.0051));
double mp = (lp + (N * 0.04));
double np = (mp + (N * 0.0206));
double op = (np + (N * 0.0097));
double ppo = (op + (N * 0.0091));
double qp = (ppo + (N * 0.0138));
double rp = (qp + (N * 0.0145));
double sp = (rp + (N * 0.0041));
double tp = (sp + (N * 0.0187));
double up = (tp + (N * 0.0211));
double vp = (up + (N * 0.0311));
double wp = (vp + (N * 0.0171));
double xp = (wp + (N * 0.0093));
double yp = (xp + (N * 0.0189));
double Aap = (yp + (N * 0.0032));
double Bbp = (Aap + (N * 0.0059));
double Ccp = (Bbp + (N * 0.0090));
double Ddp = (Ccp + (N * 0.0041));
double Eep = (Ddp + (N * 0.0279));
double ffp = (Eep + (N * 0.0065));
double ggp = (ffp + (N * 0.0616));
double hhp = (ggp + (N * 0.0312));
double iip = (hhp + (N * 0.0024));
double jjp = (iip + (N * 0.0361));
double kkp = (jjp + (N * 0.0122));
double llp = (kkp + (N * 0.0125));
double mmp = (llp + (N * 0.0398));
double nnp = (mmp + (N * 0.0033));
double oop = (nnp + (N * 0.0152));
double ppp = (oop + (N * 0.0027));
double qqp = (ppp + (N * 0.0205));
double rrp = (qqp + (N * 0.0855));
double ssp = (rrp + (N * 0.0093));
double ttp = (ssp + (N * 0.0019));
double uup = (ttp + (N * 0.0261));
double vvp = (uup + (N * 0.0223));
double wwp = (vvp + (N * 0.0057));
double xxp = (wwp + (N * 0.018));
double yyp = (xxp + (N * 0.0018));
double zzp = (yyp + (N * 0.0021));
//for (var index = 0; index < Ap; index++)
//{
int Alabama = 0;
int place = Convert.ToInt32(Ap);
SMR(vec, Alabama, place, out A);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(Ap); index < Bp; index++)
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//{
int Alaska = Convert.ToInt32(Ap);
place = Convert.ToInt32(Bp);
SMR(vec, Alaska, place, out B);
// }
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(Bp); index < Cp; index++)
//{
int Arizona = Convert.ToInt32(Bp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(Cp);
SMR(vec, Arizona, place, out C);
// }
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(Cp); index < Dp; index++)
//{
int Arkansas = Convert.ToInt32(Cp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(Dp);
SMR(vec, Arkansas, place, out D);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(Dp); index < ep; index++)
//{
int California = Convert.ToInt32(Dp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(ep);
SMR(vec, California, place, out E);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(ep); index < fp; index++)
//{
int Colorado = Convert.ToInt32(ep);
place = Convert.ToInt32(fp);
SMR(vec, Colorado, place, out f);
// }
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(fp); index < gp; index++)
//{
int Connecticut = Convert.ToInt32(fp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(gp);
SMR(vec, Connecticut, place, out g);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(gp); index < hp; index++)
//{
int Delaware = Convert.ToInt32(gp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(hp);
SMR(vec, Delaware, place, out h);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(hp); index < ip; index++)
//{
int Florida = Convert.ToInt32(hp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(ip);
SMR(vec, Florida, place, out i);
//}
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//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(ip); index < jp; index++)
//{
int Georgia = Convert.ToInt32(ip);
place = Convert.ToInt32(jp);
SMR(vec, Georgia, place, out j);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(jp); index < kp; index++)
//{
int Hawaii = Convert.ToInt32(jp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(kp);
SMR(vec, Hawaii, place, out k);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(kp); index < lp; index++)
//{
int Idaho = Convert.ToInt32(kp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(lp);
SMR(vec, Idaho, place, out l);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(lp); index < mp; index++)
//{
int Illinois = Convert.ToInt32(lp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(mp);
SMR(vec, Illinois, place, out m);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(mp); index < np; index++)
//{
int Indiana = Convert.ToInt32(mp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(np);
SMR(vec, Indiana, place, out n);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(np); index < op; index++)
//{
int Iowa = Convert.ToInt32(np);
place = Convert.ToInt32(op);
SMR(vec, Iowa, place, out o);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(op); index < ppo; index++)
//{
int Kansas = Convert.ToInt32(op);
place = Convert.ToInt32(ppo);
SMR(vec, Kansas, place, out p);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(ppo); index < qp; index++)
//{
int Kentucky = Convert.ToInt32(ppo);
place = Convert.ToInt32(qp);
SMR(vec, Kentucky, place, out q);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(qp); index < rp; index++)
//{
int Louisiana = Convert.ToInt32(qp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(rp);
SMR(vec, Louisiana, place, out r);
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//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(rp); index < sp; index++)
//{
int Maine = Convert.ToInt32(rp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(sp);
SMR(vec, Maine, place, out s);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(sp); index < tp; index++)
//{
int Maryland = Convert.ToInt32(sp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(tp);
SMR(vec, Maryland, place, out t);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(tp); index < up; index++)
//{
int Massachusetts = Convert.ToInt32(tp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(up);
SMR(vec, Massachusetts, place, out u);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(up); index < vp; index++)
//{
int Michigan = Convert.ToInt32(up);
place = Convert.ToInt32(vp);
SMR(vec, Michigan, place, out v);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(vp); index < wp; index++)
//{
int Minnesota = Convert.ToInt32(vp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(wp);
SMR(vec, Minnesota, place, out w);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(wp); index < xp; index++)
//{
int Mississippi = Convert.ToInt32(wp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(xp);
SMR(vec, Mississippi, place, out x);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(xp); index < yp; index++)
//{
int Missouri = Convert.ToInt32(xp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(yp);
SMR(vec, Missouri, place, out y);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(yp); index < Aap; index++)
//{
int Montana = Convert.ToInt32(yp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(Aap);
SMR(vec, Montana, place, out Aa);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(Aap); index < Bbp; index++)
//{
int Nebraska = Convert.ToInt32(Aap);
place = Convert.ToInt32(Bbp);
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SMR(vec, Nebraska, place, out Bb);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(Bbp); index < Ccp; index++)
//{
int Nevada = Convert.ToInt32(Bbp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(Ccp);
SMR(vec, Nevada, place, out Cc);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(Ccp); index < Ddp; index++)
//{
int NewHampshire = Convert.ToInt32(Ccp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(Ddp);
SMR(vec, NewHampshire, place, out Dd);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(Ddp); index < Eep; index++)
//{
int NewJersey = Convert.ToInt32(Ddp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(Eep);
SMR(vec, NewJersey, place, out Ee);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(Eep); index < ffp; index++)
//{
int NewMexico = Convert.ToInt32(Eep);
place = Convert.ToInt32(ffp);
SMR(vec, NewMexico, place, out ff);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(ffp); index < ggp; index++)
//{
int NewYork = Convert.ToInt32(ffp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(ggp);
SMR(vec, NewYork, place, out gg);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(ggp); index < hhp; index++)
//{
int NorthCarolina = Convert.ToInt32(ggp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(hhp);
SMR(vec, NorthCarolina, place, out hh);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(hhp); index < iip; index++)
//{
int NorthDakota = Convert.ToInt32(hhp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(iip);
SMR(vec, NorthDakota, place, out ii);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(iip); index < jjp; index++)
//{
int Ohio = Convert.ToInt32(iip);
place = Convert.ToInt32(jjp);
SMR(vec, Ohio, place, out jj);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(jjp); index < kkp; index++)
//{
int Oklahoma = Convert.ToInt32(jjp);
106
place = Convert.ToInt32(kkp);
SMR(vec, Oklahoma, place, out kk);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(kkp); index < llp; index++)
//{
int Oregon = Convert.ToInt32(kkp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(llp);
SMR(vec, Oregon, place, out ll);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(llp); index < mmp; index++)
//{
int Pennsylvania = Convert.ToInt32(llp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(mmp);
SMR(vec, Pennsylvania, place, out mm);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(mmp); index < nnp; index++)
//{
int RhodeIsland = Convert.ToInt32(mmp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(nnp);
SMR(vec, RhodeIsland, place, out nn);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(nnp); index < oop; index++)
//{
int SouthCarolina = Convert.ToInt32(nnp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(oop);
SMR(vec, SouthCarolina, place, out oo);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(oop); index < qqp; index++)
//{
int SouthDakota = Convert.ToInt32(oop);
place = Convert.ToInt32(qqp);
SMR(vec, SouthDakota, place, out qq);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(qqp); index < rrp; index++)
//{
int Texas = Convert.ToInt32(qqp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(rrp);
SMR(vec, Texas, place, out rr);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(rrp); index < ssp; index++)
//{
int Utah = Convert.ToInt32(rrp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(ssp);
SMR(vec, Utah, place, out ss);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(ssp); index < ttp; index++)
//{
int Vermont = Convert.ToInt32(ssp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(ttp);
SMR(vec, Vermont, place, out tt);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(ttp); index < uup; index++)
//{
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int Virginia = Convert.ToInt32(ttp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(uup);
SMR(vec, Virginia, place, out uu);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(uup); index < vvp; index++)
//{
int Washington = Convert.ToInt32(uup);
place = Convert.ToInt32(vvp);
SMR(vec, Washington, place, out vv);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(vvp); index < wwp; index++)
//{
int WestVirginia = Convert.ToInt32(vvp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(wwp);
SMR(vec, WestVirginia, place, out ww);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(wwp); index < xxp; index++)
//{
int Wisconsin = Convert.ToInt32(wwp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(xxp);
SMR(vec, Wisconsin, place, out xx);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(xxp); index < yyp; index++)
//{
int Wyoming = Convert.ToInt32(xxp);
place = Convert.ToInt32(yyp);
SMR(vec, Wyoming, place, out yy);
//}
//for (var index = Convert.ToInt32(yyp); index < zzp; index++)
//{
int DC = Convert.ToInt32(yyp);
place = N - 1;
SMR(vec, DC, place, out zz);
// }
total = ((9 * A) + (3 * B) + (11 * C) + (6 * D) + (55 * E) + (9 * f) + (7 * g) + (3 * h)
+ (29 * i) + (16 * j) + (4 * k) + (l * 4) + (m * 20) + (11 * n) + (o * 6) + (p * 6)
+ (q * 8) + (r * 8) + (s * 4) + (t * 10) + (u * 11) + (v * 16) + (w * 10) + (x * 6)
+ (y * 10) + (Aa * 3) + (Bb * 5) + (Cc * 6) + (Dd * 4) + (Ee * 14) + (ff * 5) + (gg * 29)
+ (hh * 15) + (ii * 3) + (jj * 18) + (kk * 7) + (ll * 7) + (mm * 20) + (nn * 4) + (oo * 9)
+ (pp * 3) + (qq * 11) + (rr * 38) + (ss * 6) + (tt * 3) + (uu * 13) + (vv * 12) + (ww * 5)
+ (xx * 10) + (yy * 3) + (zz * 3));












}else fb = 102;
return fb;
}





public void NewSample(string fun1, string fun2, int numberN, out string outputText, out int count)
{
N = numberN;
vec = new int[N];
Random rnd = new Random();






for (int i = 1; i < N; i++)
{
num = rnd.Next(-1, 2);
vec[i] = num;
}
if (fun1.Equals("Simple Majority Rule"))
{
SMR(vec, 0, (N - 1), out out1);
outputText = outputText + "\r\n\t" + out1.ToString();
if (fun2.Equals("Difference of Votes (10)"))
{
DVR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";








else if (fun2.Equals("Electoral College"))
{
WMR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Constant 1"))
{
out2 = 1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Constant -1"))
{
out2 = -1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";










outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
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outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";








else if (fun1.Equals("Difference of Votes (10)"))
{
DVR(vec, out out1);
outputText = outputText + "\r\n\t" + out1.ToString();
if (fun2.Equals("Simple Majority Rule"))
{
SMR(vec, 0, (N - 1), out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Electoral College"))
{
WMR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Constant 1"))
{
out2 = 1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
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{outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Constant -1"))
{
out2 = -1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";










outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";








else if (fun1.Equals("Electoral College"))
{
WMR(vec, out out1);
outputText = outputText + "\r\n\t" + out1.ToString();
if (fun2.Equals("Simple Majority Rule"))
{
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SMR(vec, 0, (N - 1), out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Difference of Votes (10)"))
{
DVR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Constant 1"))
{
out2 = 1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Constant -1"))
{
out2 = -1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";










outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";








else if (fun1.Equals("Constant 1"))
{
out1 = 1;
outputText = outputText + "\r\n\t" + out1.ToString();
if (fun2.Equals("Simple Majority Rule"))
{
SMR(vec, 0, (N - 1), out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Difference of Votes (10)"))
{
DVR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




{outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Electoral College"))
{
WMR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Constant -1"))
{
out2 = -1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";










outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";









else if (fun1.Equals("Constant -1"))
{
out1 = -1;
outputText = outputText + "\r\n\t" + out1.ToString();
if (fun2.Equals("Simple Majority Rule"))
{
SMR(vec, 0, (N - 1), out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Difference of Votes (10)"))
{
DVR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Electoral College"))
{
WMR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
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}else if (fun2.Equals("Constant 1"))
{
out2 = 1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";










outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";











outputText = outputText + "\r\n\t" + out1.ToString();
if (fun2.Equals("Simple Majority Rule"))
{
SMR(vec, 0, (N - 1), out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";








else if (fun2.Equals("Difference of Votes (10)"))
{
DVR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Electoral College"))
{
WMR(vec, out out2);
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Constant 1"))
{
out2 = 1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "No";
}
}
else if (fun2.Equals("Constant -1"))
{
out2 = -1;
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + out2.ToString();
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if (out1 == out2)
{
outputText = outputText + "\t\t" + "Yes";




































private void Run_Click(object sender, EventArgs e)
{
bool res = int.TryParse(txtN.Text, out N);
//Check if a numeric value has been entered for N
if (!res)
{
MessageBox.Show("Please enter a valid numeric value for N", "Error",
MessageBoxButtons.OK, MessageBoxIcon.Error);
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}//Check if both options are chosen , if not return an error message
else if (f1.SelectedIndex == -1 || f2.SelectedIndex == -1)
{






//Clear out any previous output
Output.Text = string.Empty;
string fun1 = f1.SelectedItem.ToString();
string fun2 = f2.SelectedItem.ToString();
string sampleOutputs = string.Empty;
int count = 0;
decimal prob = 0;
if (fun1.Equals(fun2))
{




//Display the progress bar
progressBar1.Visible = true;
progressBar1.Value = 1;
Output.Text = "Function 1 Value Function 2 Value Agree(Y/N)";
for(int j = 1; j < 101; j++)
{
string newOutputText = string.Empty;
//get the output text for this current sample
int countSample = 0;
//gets the count for current sample
//Invoke the method to create a new sample
CalculationClass newCalcInstance = new CalculationClass();
newCalcInstance.NewSample(fun1, fun2, N,
out newOutputText, out countSample);
//Aggregate values collected from current sample
Output.Text = Output.Text + newOutputText;




prob = (count / 100);
Output.Text = Output.Text + "\r\n\tLikelihood of Agreement is "
+ Convert.ToString(count) + "%";
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